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ABSTRACT 
Tsunami caused by earthquakes pose a risk to New Zealand coastal communities due to 
its location on major fault lines. It is unknown whether coastal inhabitants are adequately 
prepared or even aware of the tsunami threat. Our goal was to assess and augment the awareness 
and preparedness of residents and visitors of the Greater Wellington Region (GWR). To meet 
our goal, we developed and conducted a pilot study in collaboration with the Crown Research 
Institute GNS Science. Based on the results of almost 400 face-to-face interviews with the GWR 
population, we developed a set of awareness and education proposals to support the efforts of the 
Wellington Regional Emergency Management Office. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction 
New Zealand is comprised of two main islands, the North Island and South Island, with 
over 15,000 km of coastal area (Bell & Gibb, 1996). Located in the Pacific region, about a third 
of all New Zealand's shallow earthquakes occur offshore. Subduction zones occur at a 
convergent boundary where one tectonic plate moves under another and sinks into the earth's 
mantle. Submarine faults and subduction zones create earthquakes that can cause tsunami and 
pose serious hazards for coastal cities and towns. The east coast of New Zealand lies in close 
proximity to the Hikurangi subduction zone. 
 The last major tsunami to hit New Zealand, however, was the 1868 Peru-Chile tsunami, 
which caused substantial damage to the country's infrastructure. Due to the historic infrequency 
of tsunami in New Zealand, natural hazard mitigation organizations such as the Institute of 
Geological and Nuclear Sciences (GNS), fear that public concern may be low. The recent 
disasters in the Indian Ocean regions, Samoa, and Japan have illustrated the importance of 
disaster planning and awareness to mitigate damage.  
 Wellington, the capital of New Zealand, lies on the south coast of the North Island and 
currently has developed an evacuation map (Figure A) suggesting various escape routes in the 
event of a tsunami. This map features the locations of the tsunami blue-line, which represents the 
maximum distance a tsunami will reach inland.  
 
 
Figure A - Island Bay tsunami danger zones. Grey land indicates safe elevation  
(Wellington Region Emergency Management Office; Wellington City Council, 2012) 
 
The Wellington Region Emergency Management Office (WREMO) provides extensive 
information regarding earthquake and tsunami preparation on their website and through their 
"Get Ready Get Thru" public readiness program. The city also utilizes civil defense sirens to 
alert the public of potential tsunami. However, proper warning systems and evacuation plans are 
only as effective as residents are aware, willing, and able to adhere to them. Long or strong 
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earthquakes occurring at the subduction zone and local fault lines can produce tsunami that can 
arrive in Wellington within minutes; which does not give local authorities enough time to utilize 
the warning system. Residents can learn that long or strong earthquakes can produce tsunami, 
and respond to the threat immediately, saving valuable time for evacuation. 
The purpose of our research was to design and test a pilot study to assess the awareness 
and preparedness of the Greater Wellington Region on tsunami threat. The results of our research 
will contribute to the framework for a future, nation-wide study sponsored by GNS Science. Our 
research will also assist the Wellington Region Emergency Management Office (WREMO) to 
develop enhanced programs to improve emergency response. 
Methodology 
To accomplish our goal, we developed an optimal interview location guide (Figure B) 
that targeted communities with high tsunami risk. This included tsunami blue-line communities 
such as Owhiro Bay and Island Bay. Porirua and nearby high-risk Wellington Harbour 
communities, such as the Wellington Central Business District, Petone, and Lyall Bay, were also 
targeted. 
 
 
Figure B - Interview location guide 
 
We implemented a sample of convenience to identify interview participants. We used this 
strategy to rapidly identify subjects from locations with high human foot traffic. In certain 
localities with low foot traffic, face-to-face interviews were conducted with residents at their 
homes. We conducted short (10-15 minute) face-to-face interviews with pedestrians in well-
populated public areas in the targeted communities (Figure C). We designed the interviews to 
quickly cover demographic information as well as to generate in-depth responses. We explained 
to participants that they would remain anonymous and their responses would not be used to 
identify them. Once the interview was completed, we provided information sheets that outlined 
the interview goal and contact information of GNS representatives. Additionally, to improve our 
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interview design, we requested feedback from participants who provided inappropriate or 
irrelevant responses.   
 
 
Figure C - Gaining a community perspective through public face-to-face interviews 
 
Our interview included questions designed for open-ended responses. This inherently 
yielded varied responses from participants. In order to analyze our data quantitatively and 
qualitatively, we developed representative categories into which we could sort our responses. 
Based on our review of our data, we established a coding guide to ensure accurate categorization. 
The coding guide was developed by identifying key tsunami awareness concepts that we want to 
capture, and then reviewing raw responses and generating or modifying representative categories 
based on relevant themes. Once the guide was developed, the categories were reviewed a second 
time against all interview responses to ensure their accuracy.  
We initially analyzed our data qualitatively by reviewing collected responses and forming 
an overall impression of the participant‟s awareness, preparedness, attitudes, and general 
knowledge. We formed these impressions for our entire sample as well as for specific 
communities that we were interested in understanding independently. We were able to form 
impressions based on the content and tone of participant‟s responses. 
To support our qualitative analysis, our team developed a collection of algorithms to 
analyze our data quantitatively, using the Haskell Programming Language™. We used these 
algorithms to analyze theme frequencies of coded data as well as identify correlations on all 
individual variables. After analyzing the frequencies, we used the information to produce graphs 
in Microsoft Excel to highlight main themes of our data set. The qualitative analysis was 
simultaneously supported by quantitative analysis to deduce implications, which were essential 
in generating recommendations. Throughout the analysis, we employed a grounded theory 
approach to develop a hypothesis about the underlying phenomena driving the observed trends. 
These hypotheses affected our interview content and strategy, which improved the quality and 
accuracy of our responses. 
We then studied responses and evaluated the awareness of participants and compared the 
findings of separate communities. Specifically, it was important to understand if the presence of 
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tsunami blue-lines affected risk perception and preparedness. Additionally, we compared social 
status and geography across communities in order to explain differences in awareness and 
preparedness.  
Findings and analysis 
Interview design and testing 
The design and testing of the interview itself underwent several iterations that served to 
strengthen participant response.  The interpretation of terminology in our interview varied 
depending on location and cultural background, requiring that we rephrase certain questions to 
some participants. Overall we encountered a general reluctance to be interviewed from the 
public. Cited reasons include interview length and suspected affiliations with religious and 
political organizations.  
Categorization (coding) of responses 
Originally attempting to use IBM's SPSS packages to analyze data, we found manual 
categorization of responses to be more accurate and concise than SPSS Text Analytics. An 
iterative method of categorization through group input proved critical in developing complete 
and consistent categories by eliminating individual bias. 
Analysis of responses from the GWR 
Earthquakes and tsunami are the most-cited natural disasters from our research. However, 
most participants either failed to recognize the threat of tsunami due to local earthquakes or 
could not effectively recognize local warning signs of a tsunami. Since the recent occurrence of 
the devastating 2011 Christchurch earthquake, most individuals seem more concerned about this 
natural disaster rather than a possible tsunami. This was evident when our studies revealed that 
only half of the respondents expected a tsunami in their lifetime. Furthermore, less than 7% of 
respondents could recognize the natural warnings of a local tsunami: an earthquake too strong to 
stand during or an earthquake lasting more than a minute. Even for those interviewees who 
recognized earthquake warnings, most expected confirmation from an official source in the form 
of an alarm or radio before considering evacuation. Though an official alarm is unlikely to be 
sounded during tsunami generated close enough to arrive within an hour, over two thirds of those 
who expected an alarm warning also expected no more than 30 minutes of notice prior to impact. 
While many would evacuate immediately if prompted, the most common source of delay 
was a desire to remain and assist others in evacuation. Cars were a common form of 
transportation in evacuation scenarios, with more respondents claiming to evacuate by car when 
given more warning time, which can cause dangerous traffic jams and delay evacuation. It 
appears that most participants are concerned about the risk of earthquake damage to roads, but do 
not recognize the danger of mass evacuation traffic. 
There appears to be a general lack of tsunami awareness from individuals visiting coastal 
areas of New Zealand from more inland locations of New Zealand. Though individuals from 
more inland regions of New Zealand recognize tsunami as a potential hazard, they are much 
more focused on the earthquake threat and base their evacuation behavior around more 
immediate earthquake dangers such as falling objects and broken roads. Visitors from other 
countries generally do not identify tsunami as a threat and are unaware of tsunami warning signs. 
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Compare responses of communities within the GWR 
 Residents of blue-line communities such as Owhiro Bay and Island Bay were more 
acutely aware of tsunami threat than the residents of non-blue-line communities, though it was 
not evident that they were also better prepared. We found no significant difference in 
preparedness between blue-line and non-blue-line communities, with the exception that almost 
all blue-line residents knew of the blue-line program. Even in blue-line communities, there 
seemed to be confusion about the placement of the blue-line and general distrust of the program. 
The distrust of the program seems to have resulted from a misunderstanding of how the 
placement of the blue-line was calculated. 
 
Additional Observations 
While interviewing, we observed participants displaying varied levels of confusion regarding 
question phrasing and terminology between locations. Class and education may have played a 
role in understanding but overall, the issue of class distinctions is a complicated one, and we 
could identify no strong associations between wealth and tsunami preparedness regardless of 
confusion with terminology. It seems that the perception of tsunami risk and initial reactions to 
disaster derive from a deep human response, which is common between people. 
We also feel that the inability of the inhabitants to recognize a tsunami threat when 
presented with the earthquake scenarios is likely because of two reasons. Disaster survivors 
doubt reoccurrences and those who experience frequent earthquakes are desensitized to their 
danger. The frequency of earthquakes and tendency to draw on past experiences are likely 
causing individuals to perform only standard earthquake evacuation behaviors, despite an 
earthquake‟s potential to induce a tsunami. 
 Through our observations, we have realized that individuals have been conditioned to 
expect confirmation of tsunami threat from authority. A possible explanation is that New 
Zealand residents do not trust their own instincts to judge natural warnings since they have not 
experienced a devastating tsunami induced by a local earthquake. By seeking confirmation, 
people feel more in control of the situation. 
Recommendations 
 Based on our analysis, we have generated recommendations for GNS Science and 
WREMO. The recommendations are categorized under the following two tiers: 
 Recommendations for improving future interview/survey response rate and data quality 
 Recommendations for improving awareness and preparedness of tsunami in the GWR 
 These recommendations are derived from the analysis of data collected in this pilot study 
as well as available supplemental information and programs available to residents and visitors 
through WREMO's website.  
To improve survey/interview design and implementation 
GNS, WREMO/CD (Civil Defence) logos could be present on surveys or interviewer 
clothing to help establish the credibility of the study. Clearly presenting logos also distinguishes 
the theme of the study. 
Carefully worded survey questions are essential to the success of the study.  A simpler format 
will avoid confusion or random guessing from participants. A sample of our final interview 
questions is listed in Appendix A: Version 2. Future surveys and interviews could omit the 
distinction between questions related to “earthquakes that last more than one minute” and 
“earthquakes that are difficult to stand in”. Participants did not provide distinct responses 
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between these two scenarios. This will decrease survey time and reduce the burden on 
participants.  
Mail-in surveys can be used to conduct a larger study where face-to-face interviews are 
infeasible. We have developed suggestions for a pre-coded mail-in survey based on the responses 
to our original interviews (Appendix G).  
To improve awareness and preparedness in the GWR 
WREMO‟s effort to develop public awareness with the blue-line program is a strong 
commitment to tsunami awareness.  Our work supports the idea that the agency should continue 
to implement blue-lines in communities. Our team discovered that blue-lines raise awareness and 
therefore more blue-lines would increase awareness. Additionally, WREMO could provide 
information to homes in blue-line communities or static information (such as signs) near the 
blue-lines explaining their purpose to resolve misconceptions.  
Educating communities on alarm sounds and when they would be sounded could reduce 
confusion surrounding alarm usage. This can be performed though alarms clips provided on 
emergency websites as well as audio messages with an alarm preview sent to homes.  
To help protect less informed waterfront visitors, emergency officials could work with 
Wellington city waterfront stores and restaurants to train employees on proper earthquake and 
tsunami response. Another idea is to develop official stickers on buildings in tsunami danger 
zones indicating if the building is tsunami safe (Figure D).  
 
 
Figure D - A draft illustration of the “tsunami safe” building sticker 
 
Given the success of the “duck, cover, hold” slogan, it could be beneficial for WREMO 
to develop a slogan in a similar vein that emphasizes the dangers of earthquakes that last more 
than one minute and earthquakes that are difficult to stand in. The slogan could possibly be 
“Long? Strong? Gone!” This recommendation has arisen from the overwhelming failure to 
recognize long and strong earthquakes as tsunami threats.  
We recommend that WREMO continue to stress evacuation by foot or bicycle. 
Specifically, WREMO could include images indicating proper evacuation methods on tsunami 
warning signs or could designate specific cars as tsunami transportation vehicles. This 
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recommendation has arisen from the large number of participants stating that they would flee by 
vehicle, especially in lengthier tsunami warnings. Figure E below shows an illustration of a 
possible sign we created. 
 
 
Figure E - A draft illustration signage conveying specific warning signs and transportation methods 
Image of bicycle and car inspired by (Map symbols bike clip art, 2013) and (Bednell holiday homes, 2013) 
 
Lastly, WREMO could distinctly outline personal evacuation responsibility for residents 
so that they can feel confident in the actions they should take before evacuating. This suggestion 
has resulted from the numerous participants who stated that they were unsure of how much time 
they should spend assisting others before evacuating. GWR inhabitants could adopt a self-
preservation belief similar to Japan‟s “tsunami tendenko” or another belief that appeals more to 
Kiwi values.  
Conclusion 
This study has confirmed low tsunami preparedness in the GWR. We have also piloted, 
tested, and revised questions for a greater survey to be distributed by GNS Science related to 
tsunami awareness and preparedness. Lastly, we have assessed the impact of education efforts 
such as the tsunami blue-line and its influence on communities‟ awareness and preparedness.  
New Zealand‟s position on seismically active ground establishes the importance of 
conducting research to ensure the preparedness and safety of communities. Using what has been 
learned from this pilot study, a larger study could evaluate the awareness and preparedness of a 
greater portion of the GWR. Similar pilot studies can be conducted in areas where little is known 
about preparedness and awareness in order to prepare for a larger study. Once levels of 
awareness and preparedness have been measured, WREMO can develop or improve education 
programs to address the gaps in tsunami awareness and preparedness of GWR residents and 
visitors. Developing effective disaster education programs is vital in saving lives during 
earthquakes and resultant tsunami in countries with large coastal areas such as New Zealand. 
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Without proper education in threatened areas, individuals will not be able to react quickly 
enough to a locally induced tsunami, potentially leading to severe damage and loss of life as 
reflected in the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Improving education efforts has been proven to 
help mitigate the loss of life, as seen in the Great East Japan Tsunami in 2011. As research is 
conducted on tsunami awareness and preparedness, education programs can properly evolve to 
minimize the loss of life during natural disasters.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
According to a report by the United States National Academies, nearly two-thirds of the 
world's population (approximately 3.6 billion people) lives within 100 miles of the coastline 
(The National Academies, 2007). Recent occurrences of major earthquakes and tsunami, such as 
the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, the 2009 Samoa earthquake, and the Japan tsunami in 2011 
have challenged the resilience and preparedness of the affected nations, with many communities 
still recovering from the disasters. The Indian Ocean tsunami demonstrated how unpreparedness 
made regions vulnerable, as it resulted in the death of at least 230,000 individuals and 2.9 billion 
dollars in damages (Athukorala & Resosudarmo, 2005) 
New Zealand is vulnerable to natural hazards such as earthquakes and tsunami, with more 
than 15,000 km of coastline and its proximity to the Hikurangi subduction zone (Bell & Gibb, 
1996). The last major tsunami to hit New Zealand, however, was the 1868 Peru-Chile tsunami, 
which caused substantial damage to the country's infrastructure. Due to the historic infrequency 
of tsunami in New Zealand, natural hazard mitigation organizations such as GNS Science, fear 
that public concern may be low. The recent disasters in the Indian Ocean regions, Samoa, and 
Japan have illustrated the importance of disaster planning and awareness. Although earthquakes 
and tsunami cannot be fully predicted or prevented, the possible resulting damages and casualties 
can be mitigated if the community is sufficiently prepared. 
Currently, Wellington has a color-coded evacuation plan in place in case of tsunami 
warning. This plan utilizes evacuation maps (Figure 1) with suggested evacuation routes from 
different zones; each zone indicates how severe the threat of tsunami is based on the location‟s 
height above sea level. In the event of a severe earthquake, people are expected to immediately 
follow the closest evacuation route outlined on the map, leading them to a safe zone. Wellington 
utilizes civil defense sirens mounted on vehicles and helicopters to alert the public. 
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Figure 1 - Island Bay tsunami danger zones. Grey land indicates safe elevation  
(Wellington Region Emergency Management Office; Wellington City Council, 2012) 
 
However, in the case of tsunami produced from long or strong local earthquakes, there 
may not be enough time to utilize this system. Individuals would be forced to evaluate the 
strength of an earthquake and decide whether to immediately travel above the blue-line. The 
blue-line, an evacuation boundary implemented in two Greater Wellington Region (GWR) 
communities, indicates the maximum distance a tsunami will reach inland. However, evacuation 
tools such as the blue-line are only as effective as residents are aware and willing to adhere to 
them. 
GNS Science is a New Zealand research institute that is heavily involved in many areas 
of environmentally- related research including natural hazards. Given the catastrophic tsunami 
that have occurred in the last 10 years, GNS has taken an interest in understanding how prepared 
the residents of New Zealand are for a possibly devastating earthquake and tsunami. 
Accordingly, GNS has commissioned us to conduct a pilot study to assess the Greater 
Wellington residents' awareness and preparedness in the event of a local subduction zone 
earthquake and resulting tsunami, as well as in the event of warnings from distant sources. We 
wanted to determine if residents understand the difference between an earthquake that last more 
than a minute and one that is too strong to stand in, and if this understanding affects resident's 
preparedness. Additionally, we intended to evaluate the effectiveness of education efforts such as 
the tsunami blue-line, and make suggestions for possible improvements. Lastly, we wished to 
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assess the current public attitude towards the likelihood and severity of possible local natural 
disasters. 
The insight into the level of understanding of the Greater Wellington Region population 
related to potential tsunami and earthquake threat provided by our pilot study will set the 
framework for a larger study to be conducted by GNS.  Ultimately, our study will allow risk 
management agencies such as the Wellington Region Emergency Management Office 
(WREMO) to more effectively identify areas of nescience on which to focus tsunami education 
efforts. 
For WREMO to improve its risk management system, it is prudent to assess the current 
public attitude towards the likelihood and severity of possible local natural disasters. To that end, 
risk communication and perception are two important factors that aided in the evaluation of the 
Greater Wellington Region tsunami preparedness. Designing a survey that can measure these 
factors is challenging because it is difficult to predetermine possible responses without a deeper 
understanding of the communities‟ attitudes. Ultimately, the process of evaluation contributed to 
better sense the research questions needed to understand attitudes and knowledge of residents 
towards the risk of tsunami and earthquakes. This understanding helped to assess the 
effectiveness of Wellington's risk communication and make recommendations for a larger study 
to be conducted by GNS. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter considers tsunami risk perception and communication in greater depth. First, 
we outline tsunami risk mitigation factors through studies conducted on communities that 
recently experienced tsunami generated by earthquakes measuring a magnitude of 8 or above.  
Second, we study the fundamentals of risk perception and communication, and attempt to 
explain people's behavior during disasters. Finally, we study survey theory and design to guide 
our methodologies. 
2.1 Tsunami response and risk mitigation factors 
Earthquakes and tsunami are natural disasters that can result in death and severe damage 
to a country's infrastructure. Earthquakes first occur by the shifting and breaking of the Earth's 
tectonic plates, most frequently in or near a subduction zone.  These subduction zones are areas 
at the plate boundaries where one tectonic plate moves under another, with one plate sinking into 
the mantle as it pushes the other plate up. Under these conditions, tsunami can occur when an 
offshore earthquake displaces the seafloor, creating a series of large waves. The size of a tsunami 
is dependent on the strength, distance to shore, and shallowness of the earthquake. Tsunami can 
occur anywhere in the world along a coastline and can travel over a long distance across the 
ocean. 
Since 2004, the world has experienced several devastating tsunami resulting from 
earthquakes, including the Sumatra-Andaman Earthquake in 2004, the Samoa Earthquake in 
2009, and the Tohoku Earthquake in Japan in 2011, responsible for numerous deaths and a great 
deal of destruction. When attempting to minimize deaths from a tsunami, communities have the 
option of implementing protective structures such as evacuation buildings and sea walls, or less 
costly evacuation plans. According to the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, disasters 
cannot be fully prevented by the structural measures and technology invested with enormous 
budget emphasizing the importance of alternative disaster prevention methods such as 
evacuation protocols (Okada, 2012, p. 371). Therefore, addressing the problem of tsunami 
disaster mitigation through evacuation is a more effective and less costly alternative to the use of 
evacuation buildings.  
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We have identified three factors that impact the success of an evacuation: 
communication, education, and the human response. Communication determines how effectively 
the community is informed when there is an impending disaster. Education, in the broadest 
sense, provides residents and visitors with information about how to respond and where to go 
given an imminent disastrous situation. Education can refer to information disclosed by 
governments or emergency management offices, and can also refer to community experience or 
exposure to tsunami. Surviving a tsunami can give experience to a community, preventing future 
tsunami-related casualties. Lastly, the human response describes how people actually react 
during a disaster, and what causes their reactions. We will outline how these factors impacted the 
communities affected by the tsunami generated by the Sumatra-Andaman Earthquake, the Great 
East Japan Earthquake, and the Samoa Earthquake.  
2.1.1 Communication 
Communicating warnings is necessary for evacuating populations. When there is 
advanced notice that a tsunami is approaching, warnings can be sent out in time for people to 
evacuate. However, in the case of New Zealand, an earthquake can occur at the local Hikurangi 
subduction zone and produce a tsunami that can arrive within minutes. This presents a challenge 
to the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM), which is responsible 
for sending out warnings for evacuation. According to Wei, et al (2012, pg. 1), "most near-field 
tsunami warnings and forecasts rely primarily on preliminary information of earthquake location, 
depth, and magnitude, which are routinely computed within minutes." When a tsunami wave can 
reach shore in a few minutes, the few minutes it takes to get a forecast for the severity of the 
tsunami can be too late. 
The Sumatra-Andaman Earthquake, the cause of the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, 
reportedly struck at a magnitude of 9.2, but it was originally underestimated. The tools used to 
determine the magnitude of the earthquake are designed for speed, and tend to underestimate any 
earthquake with a magnitude larger than 8.5 (Kerr, 2005). The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center 
(PTWC) released its warning for a magnitude 8 earthquake 15 minutes after the earthquake. 
After an hour, the PTWC determined that it was an 8.5 magnitude earthquake, 5.6 times stronger, 
but again an underestimate. By that time, many of the surrounding island nations had already 
been struck, and the risk of the tsunami traveling across the Bay of Bengal was considered 
insignificant. The Harvard Centroid Moment Tensor (CMT) project was able to determine the 
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earthquake was a magnitude 9.0, five hours after the earthquake, and days later, further analysis 
found that it was between 9.2 and 9.3 in magnitude. GPS methods could have accurately 
determined the magnitude of the Sumatra-Andaman earthquake within 15 minutes. This still 
would have been too late to produce an effective warning for the islands close to the epicenter, 
such as Gizo (Blewitt, et al, 2006). 
Tsunami have hit the Japanese coastline frequently throughout history, most recently by 
the 2011 tsunami responsible for thousands of deaths. Japan, like New Zealand, is located in a 
subduction zone and earthquakes produced off shore can result in large tsunami that can arrive in 
minutes. In such cases, warnings would need to be issued rapidly. The Japan Meteorological 
Agency (JMA) monitors seismic activity and gives tsunami warnings, but is challenged with 
transmitting alerts before the tsunami waves arrive. The current system uses the Geostationary 
Meteorological Satellite (GMS) to broadcast warnings in a matter of minutes to those near the 
shore (Tsuchiya and Shuto, 1995). During the 2011 tsunami, JMA initially sent out a warning for 
waves of 3-6 m height, three minutes after the earthquake. Twenty-eight minutes later, they sent 
a revised warning for waves of 6-10 m or more in some areas. After forty-five minutes, the 
warning was updated for waves over 10 m along coastal areas (Tsushima, et al, 2011). This is a 
similar situation to the Indian Ocean tsunami described earlier. The tool used to determine the 
magnitude of the earthquake underestimated it (Kerr, 2005). Japan may have one of the most 
robust tsunami warning systems in the world but the technology they rely on still has the 
potential to fail or produce inaccurate data. 
A magnitude 8.1 earthquake and two sub-events of magnitude 7.8 occurring in the 
Kermadec-Tonga subduction zone caused a series of tsunami that struck Samoa, American 
Samoa, and Tonga, killing 192 people in 2009 (Okal et al., 2010). The PTWC issued a warning 
16 minutes after the earthquake, but in some areas, the tsunami hit within 15 minutes of the 
earthquake (Okal et al., 2010).  On the island of Futuna, no warning was issued, and their coast 
was hit by tsunami over an hour after the earthquake. Fortunately, there were no casualties. The 
PTWC issued a tsunami warning for Wallis and Futuna, however in the confusion, the authorities 
on Wallis (whom controlled the tsunami warning sirens on Futuna) did not sound the sirens 
(Lamarche, Pelletier, and Goff, 2010). 
The New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management recommends 
that individuals heed "natural" warnings, such as earthquakes (Ministry of Civil Defense and 
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Emergency Management, 2008). If there is a strong earthquake (defined as an earthquake in 
which it is difficult to stand up), a long earthquake (defined as an earthquake lasting more than 
one minute), unusual noises coming from the sea, or the sight of the ocean rushing in or out, all 
threatened zones should evacuate immediately because a tsunami may be approaching. If a 
tsunami is coming from across the Pacific, there may be enough time to release an official 
warning and evacuate only particular zones that are in danger. In these cases the PWTS and GNS 
Science feasibly have enough time to provide information about the tsunami to MCDEM, so that 
they can issue warnings. If a tsunami is generated locally, as stated previously, a resident's or 
visitor's safety will rely on their prior training for tsunami warning and proper evacuation 
procedure.   
2.1.2 Community education and experience 
Ultimately, a warning system cannot replace education, as in some locations a warning 
after 15 minutes is too late. In an article written in The Lancet, Pincock (2007) quotes Gerard 
Fryer, a geophysicist at the Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre, "for the people within the source 
region of the earthquake, they basically have to be educated. If the ground shakes, get away from 
the ocean”. The three cases described here demonstrate the importance of education. In all three 
cases, there was a delay in administering a tsunami warning because of uncertainty of the 
tsunami predictions. This left only minutes between the warning and when the first tsunami 
waves hit. Education is vital, especially when a tsunami is generated from a local earthquake, 
because the tsunami may reach the shores before the warning reaches the community. If 
members of a community are trained, people can respond to a long or strong earthquake more 
quickly than a warning can be communicated. Individuals can learn to evacuate to higher ground 
immediately after an earthquake with the assumption that a tsunami may be imminent. 
The Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami resulted in widespread and overwhelming 
damage to Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand and eight other countries. About a month after 
the tsunami struck, a team of social science researchers from the Disaster Research Center of the 
University of Delaware, and the Emergency administration and Planning Program of the 
University of North Texas participated in a research expedition in some affected areas of India 
and Sri Lanka. The team found that there was a general lack of awareness regarding tsunami. In 
fact, one elementary school teacher reported that none of her students knew what a tsunami was 
(Rodriquez, Wachtendorf, Kendra, and Trainor, 2006). The communities that were being 
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investigated had never experienced a tsunami and therefore most of the people of those 
communities could not describe how a tsunami occurs, what to do in the event of a tsunami, or 
what the typical warning signs were of a tsunami (Rodriquez, Wachtendorf, Kendra, and Trainor, 
2006). A separate international tsunami survey team that was dispatched to Sri Lanka after the 
Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in 2004 discovered a small village in which all but one 
villager survived. They found that there was one merchant fisherman in the village that had 
experienced a tsunami previously in Chile and identified the natural warning signs, which 
allowed him to evacuate the village (Liu et al., 2005). Records like these emphasize the 
importance of education in tsunami-vulnerable regions. In the case of Sri Lanka, the Indian 
Ocean tsunami was the first instance of an earthquake-induced tsunami affecting Sri Lanka 
(Inoue et al., 2007). Because of this, Sri Lanka had never expected a tsunami and no evacuation 
information was ever prepared (Inoue et al., 2007).  
The Tohoku earthquake, and resulting tsunami that struck Japan in March, 2011, resulted 
in 19,000 dead or missing people (Aarup, Alaiga, Elliot, Kodijat, and Yamamoto, 2012). Despite 
this high figure, 96% of residents living in inundated areas of communities visited survived, 
according to a report by GNS Science (Fraser, Leonard, Matsuo, and Murakami, 2012). These 
high survival rates were attributed to effective education and evacuation procedures (Fraser, 
Leonard, Matsuo, and Murakami, 2012). Disaster preparedness education is promoted by both 
the Japanese government and the local disaster management offices. The Japanese cabinet office 
released disaster management guidelines in February of 2011, which obligates communities to 
conduct regular disaster reduction drills. Large-scale disaster reduction drills are conducted in 
every region across the country on September 1st, also known as Disaster Reduction Day. Recent 
drills have challenged the participants by providing no information about the simulation until 
after the drill has begun, much like in a real emergency state (Cabinet Office, Government of 
Japan, 2011). In cities such as Kesennuma and Kamaishi, local residents and officials have given 
even more attention to tsunami disaster preparedness. Volunteers within these towns have 
distributed hazard maps prepared by the government to each household. The communities have 
also encouraged discussions and practices to locate evacuation sites and routes (Mimura, 
Yashuhara, Kawagoe, Yokoki, and Kazama, 2011). 
One factor related to education that has been shown to effectively minimize tragedy is 
experience. The Sanriku coast in Japan is an area that has experienced large tsunami in the past 
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37 years that have resulted in a lower death ratio with each new tsunami. The power of 
experience to encourage evacuation is demonstrated by questionnaire results collected in 
2011.  The survey concerning the Great East Japan Tsunami found that 90% of residents in 
Kamashi City (located in the Sanriku coast) evacuated quickly and 60% evacuated within ten 
minutes after the earthquake. The Sendai plains, however, have had little experience with serious 
tsunami and the results from the same questionnaire found that only 60% evacuated quickly and 
30% evacuated within 30 minutes of the earthquake (Suppasri, 2012). Some locales have 
established public events to commemorate these devastating experiences. The festival of 
Wakayama encourages residents, especially children, to reflect on past tsunami and to become 
more aware of the possibilities and dangers (Suppasri, 2012). "Tsunami Stones" are stone tablets 
as old as 600 years that are situated along Japans northern coasts and attempt to warn people of 
tsunami threats.  Some stones display messages that instruct people to seek higher ground after a 
strong earthquake while other stones list past death tolls and mark mass graves. The village of 
Aneyoshi in particular, heeded the warning from one of their stones instructing them to build 
houses on higher ground, which spared the village from tsunami damage (Fackler, 2011). 
Possibly the most powerful education tool that is used by the Japanese is the legend of the 
"tsunami tendenko". Tsunami tendenko encourages individuals to ignore their belongings and 
their families and focus only on saving themselves. In one instance, the practice of tsunami 
tendenko led a group of children to begin evacuation on their own, which saved their lives in the 
event known as the "Miracles of Kamaishi" (Suppasri, 2012). 
During the Samoan Earthquake in 2009, the education efforts and evacuation exercises 
that had been initiated in the Pacific over many years saved the lives of many Pacific Islanders. 
Many Samoans and Tongans knew to evacuate to higher ground the moment that they felt the 
earthquake or saw the ocean recede. This was essential in saving the lives of these people, as 
they were aware that the earthquake would result in a tsunami (Okal et al., 2010).  
2.1.3 Human response to tsunami threats 
Because of the lack of education and warning systems in the Indian Ocean area, many 
people were completely unaware of the dangers posed to them after the Sumatra-Andaman 
earthquake struck in 2004. The recession of the ocean due to the tsunami did not alarm many 
residents, instead there were reports of people taking pictures of the receding ocean and 
collecting stranded fish (Levy and Gopalakrishnan, 2005). The residents' only realization of 
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danger came when the large tsunami waves rushed the shore. This behavior can be seen in 
several tsunami witness videos (Texas A&M University, 2009). 
The response of the Japanese during the Great East Japan tsunami and earthquake 
however, was much more organized and beneficial than the response of the victims of the Indian 
Ocean tsunami. Although most people successfully evacuated before the tsunami struck Japan as 
demonstrated by the 96% survival rate, those who did not survive failed to evacuate for several 
reasons (Fraser, Leonard, Matsuo, and Murakami, 2012). According to a report from GNS 
Science, people delayed their evacuation or simply did not evacuate due to familial 
responsibility, lack of education, or skepticism of warnings. Residents and visitors also used 
inappropriate modes of transportation, such as motor vehicles, which resulted in traffic 
congestion. In some cases, individuals returned to the evacuation zone before it was safe because 
they were unaware of when the series of tsunami waves would arrive or the duration of the event 
(Fraser, Leonard, Matsuo, Murakami, 2012). A report by Miguel Esteban, coastal engineer, 
boasts of the well-developed early warning and evacuation systems implemented by Japan, 
stating that "only three minutes after the earthquake, a tsunami warning was issued in Tohoku, 
arguably the fastest response of any such system in any country in the world" (Esteban, 
Tsimopoulou, Shibayama, Mikami, and Ohira, 2012). Despite these claims, the report admits that 
many people neglected to evacuate initially because the first warning underestimated the severity 
of the incoming tsunami. By the time the second corrected warning had been issued, it was too 
late for many people to escape. This report is consistent with the account from GNS Science 
suggesting that attempting to flee by motor vehicle caused traffic jams. In a report from Pure 
Applied Geophysics, the authors emphasize how certain Japanese communities that regularly 
experienced tsunami sustained significantly fewer fatalities than other communities during the 
Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami (Suppasri, 2012). We believe that this is because of 
their familiarity with evacuation procedure and their accessibility to safety areas. 
Communities in Samoa, American Samoa, and Tonga responded well to the natural signs 
of a tsunami. Many Samoans and Tongans knew from experience and education to get to higher 
ground after an earthquake, which was instrumental in saving lives. However, during the 
evacuation, there were cases of unnecessary deaths from confusion and panicked attempts to 
escape in cars. If the victims had evacuated by walking, running, or cycling, they could have 
escaped. A surprising number of victims went towards the dangerous areas. On the island of 
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Niuatoputapu in Tonga, seven victims went closer to shore to evacuate the principal of a school. 
The individuals were caught by the tsunami, while the principal had already evacuated (Okal et 
al., 2010). Education must be tailored to ensure individuals know how to properly evacuate, and 
what not to do. Had these individuals evacuated properly, their deaths could have been avoided.  
The factors discussed above demonstrate successful and unsuccessful reactions to 
devastating earthquakes and tsunami. Success relied on the quality of warnings communicated, 
the education of affected residents, and the response of the residents and visitors during the 
tsunami event.  Although New Zealand has not experienced a devastating tsunami in the recent 
past, local emergency management organizations still provide several resources to help 
communicate warnings and educate the public on tsunami hazards.  
2.2 New Zealand's risk communication and emergency planning system 
The Greater Wellington Region provides information and functions to support the 
awareness and preparedness of hazards through the Wellington Region Emergency Management 
Office (WREMO) by carrying out Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) 
functions.  WREMO offers information regarding how to act during different types of natural 
hazards including tsunami, and a forum for how people can learn more. WREMO offers 
residents an emergency preparedness information packet, offers businesses presentations of 
hazards and preparedness, and offers schools advice on proper evacuation procedures and 
responses (Wellington City Council, 2012). WREMO recently launched the blue-line campaign, 
which painted blue-lines on the streets in the Island Bay, and Owhiro Bay.  As mentioned 
previously, the blue-line indicates the highest level water will reach in the worst possible 
tsunami. It is stressed that if people experience an earthquake that is difficult to stand in or lasts 
for more than one minute, then they should evacuate from any threatened zones above the blue-
line. The blue-line in Owhiro Bay is seen below in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 - The tsunami blue-line in Owhiro Bay 
 
The “Get Ready Get Thru” program is available as a resource providing information 
related to natural hazards (including earthquakes and tsunami) and actions people should take 
before, during, and after a disaster. The guide suggests that individuals move inland after an 
earthquake if they are on a beach or near the coast. The guide also outlines three different types 
of threatening tsunami including distant, regional, and local tsunami and the differences between 
them. Distant tsunami refers to those generated from across oceans in which New Zealand will 
have three or more hours of warning time. Regional tsunami are generated from in locations such 
as the Kermadec Trench, which can lead to a tsunami in one to three hours. Local tsunami are 
generated very close to New Zealand and can produce a tsunami that leads to only a few minutes 
warning. Natural, official, and unofficial warnings are discussed as well, including the tsunami 
threat caused by earthquakes lasting more than one minute and earthquakes that make it difficult 
to stand. WREMO notes that official warnings, such as those issued by local councils through 
sirens and local media, are only possible during regional and distant tsunami. This means that 
official warnings such as sirens are only likely in the event when a tsunami arrives in an hour or 
more. WREMO stresses that individuals should evacuate by foot or by bicycle and to only 
evacuate by vehicle if absolutely necessary (New Zealand Government, Civil Defence, 2012). 
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In addition to these resources, the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management (MCDEM) promotes exercises that are performed multiple times a year, which 
simulate real life situations.  New Zealand has performed tsunami exercises in 2006, 2009, 2010 
and 2011 in which tsunami simulations of varying distance and severity were tested.  The 
MCDEM also uses mass media campaigns, advertising, and promotional activities to raise 
awareness and teach preparedness.  Through local offices and government programs discussed 
above, information is extensively available to the public.  The practice of familiarizing residents 
with tsunami evacuation procedures through drills and interactive activities occurs infrequently, 
however, because MCDEM focuses on many hazards, not only tsunami (New Zealand 
Government, Civil Defence, 2012). 
New Zealand is similar to Japan given that they both have significant coastal 
vulnerability.  Although Japan experiences tsunami more frequently, both Japan and New 
Zealand are at risk for a devastating tsunami because are they both are located near active 
faults.  Therefore, Japan's highly-regarded tsunami disaster mitigation procedures provide a good 
model for consideration when improving New Zealand's existing mitigation efforts.  As 
discussed previously, regular experience with evacuation drills helps to keep residents aware and 
prepared.  Because residents of the Greater Wellington Region have not experienced a severe 
tsunami in the recent past, they have not been able to demonstrate their preparedness of tsunami 
hazard.  Given that community wide preparation activities are less common in New Zealand, 
community preparedness is in question. GNS Science is conducting ongoing surveys that attempt 
to gauge the preparedness and perception of risk in the Greater Wellington Region, as 
understanding risk perception and communication is critical to focusing and improving tsunami 
education. 
2.3 Risk perception and communication 
If we are to design surveys or interviews to assess risk perception related to tsunami, we 
must consider the extensive literature devoted to understanding how this is measured. An 
individual's risk perception of an event is their subjective understanding of its attributes and 
severity (Douglas & Mary, 1985). Risk communication is the task of ensuring that a population's 
perception of risk matches the true risk presented. Risk communication is a critical component of 
disaster preparation, as the effects of a natural disaster on an unaware population can be 
devastating. 
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In the case of the 2012 Hurricane Sandy, although many meteorologists had predicted 
that this hurricane would be devastating and New York government officials declared state of 
emergency three days in advance, many people failed to heed these warnings as they believed 
that the government and the media were exaggerating its severity. Consequently, when Hurricane 
Sandy struck, it ravaged the city of New York, leaving behind USD $60 billion worth of 
damages. Furthermore, Sandy was the second most deadly hurricane to hit the state. Risk 
perception plays a key role in evaluating the preparedness and awareness of a community in the 
event of a natural disaster (Faler, 2012). 
In the event of emergency, many people, particularly young adults, are inclined to an 
emotional response, which can cloud an individual's logic (Lerner et al., 2003, Carstensen, 
2006). Thus, understanding emotional responses to risk and communication in a population is 
critical to improving risk communication. Risk perception can also be influenced by 
demographic factors, such as age and income. Older individuals tend to have more concern of 
risk in their immediate future, while younger adults tend to respond more emotionally to risk 
(Cartensen, 2006). Additionally, low-income families are more reluctant to evacuate before 
natural disasters, citing distrust of authority and financial burden as more dominant factors than 
those of the general population (Elder et. al, 2007). 
        There are some common factors involved in how people perceive risk. Individual control is 
a significant factor in risk perception. Risks perceived to be under the individual's control are 
more readily accepted, while those that are unfamiliar or uncontrollable are considered greater, 
but more distant. Paradoxically, natural disasters are perceived to be less of a threat than 
corresponding human-caused disasters such as global warming (U.S. Department of Health, 
2002). Thus, it is important to communicate the present tsunami threat, and particularly, to 
convey that residents can be safe by taking appropriate action in the event of a tsunami. 
The main purpose of risk communication is to align a community's perception of risk 
with the real risk, thus eliminating incorrect responses in natural disasters. Officials can 
maximize the effectiveness of their communication by following certain key principles 
(Fischhoff, 1995). Initially, it is important for officials to facilitate trust and partnership with the 
public. To maintain this trust, it is vital for official sources to communicate explicit and accurate 
information to the public. Providing accurate and complete information will eliminate public 
criticism and suspicion. It is also important that risk assessors and managers make their 
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assessments explicit and clarify any uncertainty that recipients may have. This will maintain the 
risk assessors' credibility and allow the recipient to better understand the degree of risk. 
Fischoff (1995) proposed that an "individual's beliefs are elicited using a mixture of 
open-ended and structured procedures" through a study using influence diagrams to display 
factors involved in managing hazards (pg.140). With this information, "communication can then 
be crafted to fill in gaps, reinforce correct beliefs, and correct misconceptions - with some 
assurance that the messages are to the point and can be comprehended by the recipients" 
(Fischhoff, 1995, pg. 140). It is helpful to compare unfamiliar risks to familiar risks, and to 
encourage people to draw on their past experience in handling the unfamiliar risk. Because there 
are many factors affecting risk perception and communication, which vary between populations, 
it is important to understand how a specific population perceives risk before effective risk 
communication can be implemented. 
2.3.1 Measuring perception of risk 
Surveys and interviews are primary tools for acquiring detailed and specific information 
about a sample population, where the information cannot be readily extracted from public 
sources. Survey and interview design theory is an expansive field of research in its own right and 
no "perfect" formula for survey design is established that covers all applications. Nevertheless, 
there is a deep body of established practices from which to draw on in the design of our study. 
Here we give a brief overview of the general theory of survey and interview design, and address 
the specific tools that have proven effective in recent disaster awareness studies. There are many 
factors to consider when designing and evaluating a survey or interview, such as the choice of a 
quantitative or qualitative focus, response analysis and bias elimination.  
The single biggest initial decision in the design of a survey-based study is the choice 
between using a Hypothesis-Testing or Hypothesis-Generating approach. A hypothesis-testing 
approach is appropriate when a reasonably confident hypothesis can be formulated from the 
existing literature alone, and is mainly driven by quantitative techniques. Contrastingly, a 
hypothesis-generating approach is more favorable when a confident hypothesis cannot be 
generated from the existing data, and is mainly driven by qualitative techniques (Auerbach & 
Silverstein, 2003). 
One can categorize both their qualitative and quantitative data via coding into a form 
amenable to analysis before they can validate a hypothesis. According to Statistics Canada 
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(2003, pg. 3), "Coding is the process of assigning a numerical value to responses to facilitate data 
capture and processing in general." Closed-ended questions are pre-categorized, allowing the 
respondent to choose from a pre-selected set of categories. "Multiple-choice" questions and those 
prompting for a numerical answer are both examples of closed-ended questions. These have the 
benefit of straightforward analysis to gain precise statistics such as “32% of respondents are 
"very concerned" about tsunami, 90% of which live in urban areas.” As useful as closed 
questions are, they are not suitable for all quantitative applications. Particularly, they can often 
introduce bias, and do not capture the full range of possible responses, pigeonholing potentially 
significant distinct viewpoints into the same response category (Statistics Canada, 2003). 
Open-ended questions, those that prompt the responder to answer in their own words, can 
capture the additional context necessary to facilitate accurate interpretation of the responder's 
intent. However, the task of coding open-ended questions, breaking down written paragraphs 
into concrete categories, becomes more difficult than the closed-ended analog. Some problems 
involved are biases introduced by the difference in writing styles and skill between respondents, 
and inconsistencies in interpretation between different surveyors. Many have attempted to tackle 
this dilemma, and there are established open-ended coding techniques that are suitable for many 
situations (Popping & Roberts, 2009). 
Some generally established guidelines for open-ended coding include the following: the 
chosen categories should be mutually exclusive and exhaustive; classifications should cover a 
range from general to specific, and adaptation to the situation and respondent's frame of 
reference (Montgomery & Crittenden, 1977; Lazarsfeld and Barton 1955). After data collection, 
coding methods may involve both the design of initial categories (a priori) and analysis after the 
final categories have been designated (a posteriori). Montgomery and Crittenden (1977) observe 
that a priori methods prove most effective for small pilot studies, where reliability is a concern 
given the small sample size, when compared with common a posteriori. 
The purpose of research is to answer questions, and questions do not naturally come 
equipped with testable hypotheses; they must be carefully generated. In many cases, particularly 
when beginning to tackle a complicated issue, a suitable hypothesis cannot be concluded from 
the relevant literature alone. In these situations it is necessary to conduct a qualitative 
hypothesis-generating study, with a focus on "questioning rather than measuring" (Auerbach & 
Silverstein, 2003). Because of the inherently qualitative nature of open-ended questions, they 
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often fit better in a qualitative hypothesis-generating study where their contexts can be fully 
considered, than in a strictly quantitative approach. 
Analysis of hypothesis-generating studies is based in grounded theory, a general theory 
of "ground up" hypothesis generation. It is generally conducted by first identifying the issues and 
concerns, primarily through a literature review. It is then prudent to develop a short narrative 
interview or survey, addressing the key concerns in an open way, and distribute it to an initially 
small sample group. The sample group should be expanded gradually via theoretical sampling, 
choosing new participants who have a new perspective to offer, until the sample group covers the 
complete range of perspectives. (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003; Birks & Mills, 2011). 
An important concept of grounded theory to consider throughout the process, 
occasionally seen elsewhere, is the notion of concurrent data generation, whereby data is 
gathered (via surveys, in our case) based on a working descriptive theory, which is continually 
revised as new data is collected. This is in contrast to other popular approaches, which collect a 
large amount of data based on a strong hypothesis, and then subsequently analyze all of the data. 
It is also critical to the process for researchers to record memos of their thought process 
throughout the study. Because the working theory changes so frequently, it is important to be 
able to trace the train of thought leading to a conclusion backwards, possibly across weeks or 
months, to be able to reason about its correctness. The general characteristic of hypothesis-
generating research is that it is a much more dynamic process than other approaches, and 
functions best on initially small testing groups (Birks & Mills, 2011). 
Of course, there is no reason for these two approaches, hypothesis-generating and 
hypothesis-testing, to be in conflict. Along the course of hypothesis-testing research, many 
hypotheses are discarded, and must be replaced by new ones. Thus, there is a natural cycle 
between generating hypotheses and testing them. Further, much of the quantitative data can be 
gathered concurrently with qualitative data by recording demographic and summary information 
from each respondent as well as their open-responses (Morgan 1998; Auerbach & Silverstein, 
2003; Bryman, 2006; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). The three most popular media for combining 
qualitative and quantitative methods are self-administered questionnaires, semi-structured 
interviews, and open-response questionnaires. Mixed methods can also be used to regulate each 
other, using qualitative methods to verify quantitative results, as it is often easy to spot an 
inconsistency between numeric results and a more detailed interpretation of responder's 
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intention. A qualitative understanding of perception helps design categories for coding 
quantitative surveys (Bryman, 2006). 
2.4 Summary 
Our preliminary research has enabled us to develop a greater understanding of factors 
surrounding the attitudes and response to tsunami disaster. These factors are based on risk 
perception and risk communication. The review of the studies related to tsunami disasters have 
revealed that countries in vulnerable geographic locations with poor risk communication 
experience significant mortality during a tsunami disaster. Evaluating the community‟s risk 
perception is vital to developing effective risk communication. We seek to develop 
methodologies to accomplish this evaluation. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
Our goal was to conduct a pilot study to evaluate the awareness and preparedness of 
residents and visitors of the Greater Wellington Region (GWR) for tsunami caused by 
earthquakes. GNS Science will use this information to implement a larger study to improve the 
Wellington Region Emergency Management Office's (WREMO) emergency preparedness plans. 
To accomplish our goal, we designated the following objectives: 
 To design and conduct interviews in the GWR related to tsunami threat 
 To categorize (code) responses from GWR residents and visitors 
 To analyze the responses from GWR residents and visitors 
 To compare responses of communities within the GWR 
Here we outline the key strategies we used to gather our data. 
3.1 To design and conduct interviews in the GWR related to tsunami threat 
In order to assess the awareness and preparedness of GWR residents and visitors, we 
designed and conducted interviews. Two weeks before surveying, we piloted the interview with 
the GNS Science social science staff as well as out in the field. We also considered mail-in 
surveys to improve response levels. However, in our study, we opted for open-ended face-to-face 
interviews rather than primarily closed-ended mail-in surveys for three main reasons: (a) 
Inability to predict the wide range of possible responses. Leaving responses open-ended prevents 
depth from being lost to ill-fitted categories. (b) Concern about misinterpreted questions. Face-
to-face interviews allow questions to be rephrased on demand to clarify misinterpretations. (c) 
Concern about biasing questions. Face-to-face interviews allow us to present questions to 
participants in a predetermined order, one at a time, preventing the phrasing of later questions 
from affecting the responses of earlier questions. This ordering principle cannot be guaranteed in 
general for mail-in surveys. 
3.1.1 Interview design 
To develop an optimal interview location guide, we determined communities at high 
tsunami risk using the recommendations of GNS Science and WREMO. The responses from 
these communities were used to measure the awareness and preparedness of GWR residents and 
visitors in general, as well as to compare the results between communities. This includes 
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communities with tsunami blue-lines such as Owhiro Bay and Island Bay, and nearby high-risk 
Wellington Harbour communities such as the Wellington Central Business District (Figure 3), 
and Petone. Additionally, we chose Porirua because it is a high tsunami risk community and 
there is limited information about the awareness and preparedness of Porirua residents. From this 
initial assessment, we mapped interview locations, and planned our interview route.  
 
 
Figure 3 - The Wellington Harbor’s proximity to the sea and high population density put it at high risk for tsunami 
 
We employed open-ended interviews as the primary method of data acquisition to 
provide a more detailed understanding of individuals' knowledge and concerns about earthquake-
triggered tsunami. Additionally, this interview format forces the interviewee to produce 
responses without time to prepare or research, often yielding a more accurate assessment (Doyle, 
n.d.). We conducted short (10-15 minute) face-to-face interviews with pedestrians in well-
populated public areas in the targeted communities. In certain localities with low foot traffic, 
face-to-face interviews were conducted with residents at their homes. The interview location 
guide can be seen in the figure below. 
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Figure 4 - Interview location guide 
 
3.1.2 Interview strategy 
We implemented a sample of convenience to identify interview participants. A sample of 
convenience features a part of the population that is most easily accessible or convenient. We 
used this strategy to rapidly identify subjects from locations with high human foot traffic. Upon 
arrival in targeted communities, we determined interview locations to maximize sample size by 
observing areas and determining those with consistently high foot traffic. Adhering to New 
Zealand's laws and regulations, we only requested interviews of nearby individuals who were 
above the age of sixteen years. Upon stopping a potential candidate for our interview, we would 
explain our purpose in the area as well as a basic overview of the interview and how long it 
takes. In an attempt to increase response rate, we altered our dress code and utilized the logos of 
GNS, WREMO, and WPI on our clipboards to reinforce our credibility (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5 - Usage of official logos during interviews 
 
Responses were often paraphrased or written using abbreviations in order to maximize 
information collected without burdening the participant by increasing the duration of the 
interview. We often collected information that was not especially relevant to interview questions 
but were interesting and worth noting, for example, when participants gave their opinion on the 
blue-line. These responses were either represented by quotations, or as observed themes. Figure 
6 below depicts a discussion between interviewer and respondent that lends itself to a deeper 
understanding of the participant‟s outlook. In most cases, attitudes and beliefs of participants 
were only noted once we observed them reoccurring frequently. These attitudes and beliefs were 
recognized based on the content of participants‟ responses, as well as their tone (sarcasm, anger, 
suspicion, etc.) and body language (facial expressions, engagement with interviewer, etc.). 
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Figure 6 - Discussing past experiences with earthquake survivor, given only 6 months to live 
 
We kept the interviews brief so that we could obtain a representative set of interviews 
and decrease any burden presented to the interviewees. We designed interviews to quickly cover 
demographic information as well as to generate in-depth responses. We structured the interviews 
to give participants the opportunity to mention key ideas, such as tsunami, before prompting 
questions related to those key ideas, to avoid leading the questions.  
After piloting the interviews for the first couple of days, we observed common 
inappropriate responses to questions. To better understand perceptions of the participants, we 
requested feedback from those who provided the inappropriate responses. We inquired whether 
or not specific interview questions were explicit and if they accurately portrayed our intention for 
the questions. In order to elicit accurate responses, we altered question phrasing and ordering 
while continuing to avoid leading key topics. A brief evolution of the interview questions can be 
seen in Appendix A. 
3.1.3 Disclaimers, data storage and management 
Before interviews were conducted, we briefly summarized the content and purpose of the 
interview. Specifically, we would explain that the questions were related to natural hazards and 
that the results would be used for public safety. We explained that none of the information would 
be used to identify an individual and names (if names were mentioned) would not be recorded. 
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Upon request, we informed participants that they could terminate the survey at their leisure and 
that they were not obligated to answer any questions. If participants inquired about further 
information, or the future results of the study, information sheets were provided to the 
participants. The information sheet (Appendix B) outlines the organizations involved in the study 
(GNS, WREMO, and WPI) as well as GNS contact information and related websites. Data was 
frequently transferred from paper interviews to a Microsoft Excel file, which was stored on 
password secured computers. 
3.2 To categorize (code) responses from GWR residents and visitors 
In order to analyze our data quantitatively, we needed to utilize a program to categorize 
and analyze data. Our team developed a collection of algorithms using the Haskell Programming 
Language™ (Appendix C). These statistical programs perform frequency analysis with the 
ability to apply constraints to group related questions. Additionally, the program calculated 
correlations on all individual variables, allowing us to identify thematic trends. After analyzing 
the frequencies, we used the information to produce graphs in Microsoft Excel to highlight main 
themes of our data set.  
Our interview included questions designed for open-ended responses, inherently this 
yielded varied responses from participants. Therefore, we established a coding guide to group 
our collected responses into categories before analyzing our data using the collection of 
algorithms. In the development of our coding guide, we initially recorded the raw responses from 
our data collection into a Microsoft Excel file. As a team, we reviewed the data and identified 
recurrent themes from the responses. We then generated multiple representative categories to 
encapsulate the reoccurring themes from the data. We also included static categories that would 
represent the ideal response from participants. For example, question number two of the 
interview regarding what hazards and dangers people associate with earthquakes was intended to 
measure whether or not the participant associated earthquakes with tsunami. However, the 
reoccurring responses were related to falling or collapsed buildings. Therefore, in addition to 
creating a category representing these reoccurring responses, we included a static category for 
ideal responses pertaining to tsunami. Before finalizing and applying the categories, we added, 
condensed, or expanded them as deemed appropriate. The complete coding guide can be seen in 
Appendix D. 
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3.3 To analyze responses from GWR residents and visitors 
We analyzed information from interviews to determine an overall impression of 
preparedness and risk perception of the residents and visitors of the GWR, as well as to identify 
correlating factors. Specifically, evacuation behavior was a primarily theme used to determine 
the preparedness and perception of risk in the GWR. 
We investigated correlations between participants by calculating covariance with respect 
to all measured variables, including demographic information such as age, occupation, and 
income level. We used the covariance information produced by our program to map related 
concepts, as seen in Appendix E, and identify trends in responses. We also considered deeper 
qualitative patterns with respect to their personal state of mind towards tsunami risk. We studied 
raw data from interviews during the data input process and formed an overall impression of 
different aspects we were keen in understanding. We formed an overall impression representing 
our sample as a whole, as well as formed impressions representing specific communities we 
were interested in understanding more about. We considered participant awareness, 
preparedness, attitude, and general knowledge when forming an impression of our sample. 
Occasionally, participants directly expressed their attitudes, preparedness, awareness, or 
knowledge towards certain topics such as tsunami and the blue-line and further interpretation 
became unnecessary. These instances were most influential in forming overall impressions of our 
sample. Throughout the analysis, we employed a grounded theory approach to develop a 
hypothesis about the underlying phenomena driving the observed trends. Given the limited 
sample size of this pilot study as well as the convenience sampling methods, all quantitative 
results were evaluated with caution, and used as a complement to the underlying qualitative 
evaluation, in preparation for a larger future study that will be conducted by GNS. 
3.4 To compare responses of communities within the GWR 
In order to understand how factors such as blue-line placement, geography, and general 
social status affect awareness and preparedness, we compared our findings from different 
communities. We studied responses and the resulting awareness and compared the findings of 
separate communities. Specifically, it was important to understand if presence of tsunami blue-
lines affected risk perception or preparedness. Additionally, we compared social status and 
geography across communities in order to explain differences in awareness and preparedness. 
Figure 7 below shows Owhiro Bay, one of the two blue-line communities. 
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Figure 7 - Owhiro Bay, a blue-line community 
 
During our time collecting data, we conducted 400 interviews across our six targeted 
locations within the GWR. The interviews were conducted in the street with pedestrians as well 
as door-to-door in areas with insignificant foot traffic. Some areas yielded more interviews than 
other areas, due to a heightened level of interest and higher sample pool. We will present the key 
findings and a discussion of those findings as they relate to our previously stated objectives. We 
will also present and discuss relevant anecdotal information we have collected as a team 
throughout our time conducting interviews.  
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CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
During our time collecting data, we conducted almost 400 interviews across our six 
targeted locations within the GWR. The interviews were conducted in the street with pedestrians 
as well as door to door in areas with insignificant foot traffic. Some areas yielded more 
interviews than other areas, due to a heightened level of interest and higher sample pool. We will 
present the key findings and a discussion of those findings as they relate to our previously stated 
objectives. We will also present and discuss relevant anecdotal information we have collected as 
a team throughout our time conducting interviews. Additional supportive figures for this chapter 
can be seen in Appendix F. 
4.1 To design and conduct interviews in the GWR related to tsunami threat 
Our team faced several challenges while attempting to conduct our interviews. The most 
prevalent issue was our group was repeatedly mistaken as an affiliate of a religious group or a 
charity organization. Participants often mentioned that they came to these conclusions based on 
our attire and that there were clipboards present. Coincidentally, a respondent representing 
Jehovah‟s Witnesses informed us that they were also trying to raise awareness related to natural 
disasters and the rapture. These concurrent efforts may have increased participants‟ confusion 
surrounding our intentions. When we attempted to approach participants we would often 
encounter individuals who would refuse to be interviewed until GNS Science was mentioned, 
and would then decide to accept. In some cases, individuals would ignore our team entirely and 
avoid eye contact. Based on these challenges, it was clear that some individuals judged our cause 
as uninteresting before learning what our research entailed. The main reason for individuals‟ 
reluctance to participate in our survey is likely the oversaturation of solicitors who also carry 
clipboards and approach pedestrians on public grounds. We also discovered that altering our 
clothing proved to have no significant effect on the response rate of our interviews. Potential 
participants continued to behave with skepticism until we mentioned phrases such as "natural 
disaster" or “GNS Science”. 
In our interview structure, we encountered other challenges related to the phrasing of our 
questions. Participants admitted to us that they did not recognize certain terminology; this was 
especially prevalent in the Porirua area. This may have inhibited their ability to answer questions 
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properly, as many questions could not be answered, or guessed, without recognition of the 
terminology. Specifically, words like “profession” and “hazards” needed to be defined during 
some interviews. Additionally we observed a lower response rate when we advertised interview 
lengths longer than 10 minutes. Despite those who decided to participate upon hearing “GNS 
Science”, many refused to participate even when they were informed that the theme was natural 
disasters and it was for public safety. In general, we discovered a lack of interest in participating 
in interviews related to natural disasters in the GWR.  
Other individuals were reluctant to participate in the interview or were not confident that 
our interviews would assist in public safety because of distrust towards the council. One 
individual stated hopelessly “we (New Zealanders) are too blasé towards preparation ... the city 
council sits on their hands.” Another scenario arose after a team member conducted an interview 
and an uninvolved resident approached the team member asking, “Are you working with the 
council?” When he responded “no” the resident replied, “Oh that's good, I was just making 
sure.” This encounter implied negative associations with council-related business. 
4.2 To categorize (code) responses from GWR residents and visitors 
While categorizing our responses in preparation for analysis, we encountered a few issues 
related to our categorizing methods. Most importantly, we discovered that IBM SPSS and IBM 
SPSS Text Analytics were not suited to organize data as intricately as the data we collected. 
Specifically, SPSS was encountering difficulties capturing themes from complicated responses 
involving multiple related questions. We found that it would be more time consuming to 
organize the categories generated by SPSS rather than categorize them by hand. 
 During the categorizing of our data by hand, we found some drawbacks to our approach. 
We discovered that categories tended to develop to suit a single researcher's findings. We 
eventually discovered that certain categories needed to be revised because of this bias, and the 
categories were reviewed for accuracy a second time. This is because of the influence that 
individual member's category selection had on the category selection of other members and was 
accounted for in the review of the categories. 
4.3 Results from analysis and correlations of interview responses 
 During analysis, we discovered four major themes: tsunami risk perception, responses to 
evacuation behavior interview questions, tsunami training, and tsunami awareness and 
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preparedness of residents versus visitors. This section is of our analysis and discussion of each of 
these major themes. 
Tsunami risk perception 
Though many participants identified tsunami as a potential threat, the perception of the 
risk seems to be low. When asked to describe tsunami anticipation, a prevailing and concerning 
theme of complacency in tsunami preparation has emerged. This feeling is well summarized by 
one participant, "we haven‟t had a disastrous tsunami in over 100 years. Earthquakes maybe, but 
I don‟t think we‟re much worried about tsunami". It makes sense that many individuals would 
focus on earthquake preparedness at the expense of tsunami preparedness, as New Zealand has 
not experienced a severe tsunami since 1855, but recently experienced the devastating 
Christchurch earthquake. We found this theme mirrored in our survey results; only half of 
residents expect a tsunami in their lifetime, indicating a general lack of concern. Additionally, 
many participants mentioned that they did not believe tsunami were a serious threat, or that a 
tsunami could not reach their current location. This was despite the fact that all interviews 
occurred within tsunami threatened locations. 
Inexperience with tsunami in certain areas in Japan and Sri Lanka led to slower 
evacuation times or a lack of evacuation altogether as discussed in section 2.1.3. Similar 
responses to those of Japan and Sri Lanka related to evacuation behavior have been observed in 
New Zealand communities during our studies. Specifically, we noted uncertainty related to 
tsunami events and proper evacuation procedure, with many respondents seeking confirmation 
during the interview as one particular respondent, “I think I would go up Taranaki St. - the water 
can‟t get up that high, right?” Another respondent even stated that after experiencing a strong 
earthquake that could cause a tsunami, she would gather all of her emergency supplies and sit 
next to the radio and then wait for a warning that would tell her what to do. It is likely that 
residents and visitors are more likely to seek confirmation or wait for instructions because they 
are confused or inexperienced with disaster scenarios.  
Responses to evacuation behavior interview questions 
In our observation of individuals‟ evacuation behavior responses, a significant proportion 
of the population indicated that they would travel up the closest hill on foot in the event of an 
official warning of a tsunami. However, when participants were presented with the scenarios of 
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an earthquake that lasted for more than a minute and one strong enough that they would be 
unable to stand up, a majority of them claimed they would not evacuate. Some also insisted that 
they would seek confirmation from an official warning (via television, radio, or simply waiting 
for a siren) after an earthquake before considering evacuation. Surprisingly when engaged 
further, many participants revealed that they recognized that earthquakes cause tsunami, but did 
not recognize the threat of tsunami when presented with the earthquake scenarios. Given most 
participants would evacuate during an official warning, it is likely that their reluctance to 
evacuate and desire to seek confirmation after an earthquake is due to their lack of education 
surrounding natural warnings. Failing to evacuate was a common issue in the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami, which was caused by a lack of education due to tsunami infrequency.  
Despite the fact that both earthquakes and tsunami are well known disasters in the 
Wellington region (Figure 8), it appears that tsunami hazard is overshadowed by what 
respondents perceive as more severe earthquake hazards, such as falling buildings, debris, and 
ground fissures.  
 
 
Figure 8 - Frequently cited natural disasters 
 
This is evidenced by the differences between the responses in our final question wording and our 
original question wording, which did not explicitly prompt for earthquakes that could cause a 
tsunami. In the original question, respondents would take effective earthquake response 
behaviors, such as moving to open spaces or under tables to avoid falling debris, without 
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mentioning movement to higher ground afterwards. After rewording our interview to include 
direct reference to tsunami caused by earthquakes, we received a significant increase in intention 
to evacuate to high ground. However, the fact remains that most people may forget about the 
potential for tsunami in the panic of a severe earthquake. Additionally, although most people 
were able to identify that strong earthquakes may cause tsunami, they were consistently unable 
to identify that long earthquakes pose the same danger (Figure 9). This implies that individuals 
assume that the perceived intensity of an earthquake is a direct indicator of the intensity of the 
resulting tsunami. 
 
 
Figure 9 - How a tsunami generating earthquake would feel 
 
In fact, over a quarter of the population surveyed was confused with under what conditions an 
earthquake could cause a tsunami, citing vague, immeasurable, or incorrect indicators such as 
simply "scary".  
WREMO wants individuals to use strong or long earthquakes as a warning that a tsunami 
may be incoming because of the unreliability of tsunami warning systems as discussed earlier in 
section 2.1. The agency specifically states, that in an earthquake lasting more than one minute or 
is difficult to stand up in, residents should evacuate to high ground or as far inland as possible. 
An excerpt from a WREMO brochure “Get Ready Get Thru” is featured in Figure 10.  
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Figure 10 - Tsunami natural warnings sampled from "Get Ready Get Thru" brochure 
 
Despite the information presented by WREMO, most participants in our interviews 
identified sirens or alarms as the most common warning to tsunami though some were unaware 
of what it would sound like and assumed that it would sound in all tsunami threats. Although 
many expect sirens, there is a significant amount of confusion surrounding them. Some 
participants expressed concern that the sirens would be ineffective in a tsunami emergency. One 
respondent suggested having the current sirens replaced with sirens that are more powerful 
because people may not be able to hear the warnings. We feel that these concerns are driven by 
uncertainty of who would be issuing the siren warnings and what the siren would actually sound 
like, as reported by several respondents. There is also a concern of being able to identify the 
difference between the current siren and common alarm noises such as vehicle alarms. Residents 
seem unsure about the sound of alarms and the issuing agency because alarms are seldom 
sounded. When asked how long one would expect a tsunami to occur after a siren was sounded, 
responses varied from "immediately" to more than 9 hours. The vast majority of participants 
expected a tsunami less than an hour after hearing an alarm (Figure 11), despite the fact that 
official alarms are only reliably sounded for warnings one hour or longer according to WREMO 
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information pamphlets. This misunderstanding can be hazardous if people take the absence of an 
alarm after an earthquake to mean there is no immediate tsunami threat. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Expected tsunami alarm warning time 
 
When our interview respondents recognize an imminent danger of tsunami, most 
intuitively know to find high ground as soon as possible, though many do not have a prepared 
tsunami evacuation plan or escape route. Over 40% of respondents will travel by foot to what 
they identify as the highest point; this response is by far the most common course of action 
encountered in our interviews. While some individuals stated that before leaving they would grab 
essentials, and call friends and family, the majority stated that they would not delay and would 
immediately travel to higher ground. 
However, a significant number of respondents claimed that they would attempt to assist 
people around them. This assistance included helping injured, elderly, children, and attempting 
to warn and gather people for evacuation. Other than a few respondents we interviewed who 
were a part of emergency services, most were unsure of how much time they would spend 
helping others. Residents and visitors seem unsure of what course of action they should take 
regarding the people around them before evacuating and to what extent they should take those 
actions. A few respondents even claimed that they would spend an indefinite amount of time 
helping others before evacuating. We have observed that the desire to assist others is likely due 
to either an attempt to make a positive impression on the interviewer or a natural desire to 
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preserve human life. It is unclear which of these two explanations is the main purpose for their 
intention to assist, or whether their intention to assist will translate in a disaster situation. This 
sort of behavior, while hard to condemn, led to several deaths in Japan as discussed in section 
2.1.3 Human response to tsunami threats. These actions were what led to the idea of “tsunami 
tendenko.”  
Though most participants claimed that they would evacuate on foot, a significant number 
of respondents reported that they would attempt to evacuate by vehicle initially if road conditions 
permitted (Figure 12).  
 
 
Figure 12 - Evacuation methods 
 
A fifth of participants would evacuate by car in long or strong earthquake scenario, not 
identifying the danger in attempting to evacuate by car in severe traffic jams. For example, those 
who claimed that they would abandon their cars if driving conditions were unfavorable 
mentioned nothing about the consequences of leaving a motor vehicle in roads. Further, the 
proportion of people who would evacuate by car increased for longer tsunami warnings. It seems 
that respondents are more concerned with roads damaged by earthquakes than with traffic caused 
by mass evacuation. Individuals are also likely to evacuate by vehicle in longer warnings 
because they tend to evacuate far distances to ensure their safety. Attempted evacuation by car 
caused a significant number of deaths in the 2011 Japanese tsunami because abandoned cars 
caused traffic congestion and therefore prevented evacuation. 
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Evacuation training amongst residents and visitors 
During our study, we observed that many participants had evacuation training. 
Interestingly, the majority of trained residents in our sample received training through their place 
of work or another institution with which they regularly associate. However, when we 
questioned individuals on whether or not they had received any tsunami evacuation training or 
participated in any tsunami evacuation drills, many indicated that their evacuation training was 
mostly related to fires and/or earthquakes rather than tsunami. This indicates to us that the 
workplace is the most likely location for inhabitants to receive training, though tsunami training 
is less common amongst businesses in New Zealand than fire or earthquake training.   
Tsunami awareness and preparedness of residents versus visitors 
There appears to be a general lack of tsunami awareness from individuals visiting coastal 
areas of New Zealand from more inland locations of New Zealand. Though individuals from 
more inland regions of New Zealand recognize tsunami as a potential hazard, they are much 
more focused on the earthquake threat and base their evacuation behavior around more 
immediate earthquake dangers such as falling objects and broken roads. Visitors from other 
countries generally do not identify tsunami as a threat, are unaware of tsunami warning signs, 
and generally attribute their unawareness to living in areas with little to no earthquake or tsunami 
threat. Not surprisingly, visitors from countries other than New Zealand do not know what the 
blue-line is unless they have visited communities with the blue-line. 
4.4 Awareness variations between communities  
We discovered differences between responses from communities located in the blue-line 
areas and those located in non-blue-line areas in terms of individual risk perception. In areas 
where the blue-line is located such as Owhiro Bay and Island Bay, we observed that tsunami 
appeared more frequently in conversation and that it was discussed more seriously. 
Contrastingly, in areas where officials did not implement the blue-line, such as the CBD, Petone 
and Porirua, individuals tended to speak less often about tsunami. 
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Figure 13 - The distinctive tsunami blue-line in Island Bay serves as a tool for both education and awareness 
 
Particularly, some residents of blue-line areas expressed a feeling that the introduction of the 
blue-line had raised tsunami awareness in general. The blue-line appears to clearly identify 
tsunami danger, as a significant portion of blue-line community residents were able to deduce the 
purpose of the blue-line by sight, without additional explanation (Figure 13). 
Many participants expressed their feelings towards the blue-line during interviews. 
Interestingly, when the concept of the blue-line was explained to those who were unfamiliar with 
it, they claimed it was a great idea. Many residents within blue-line communities had very 
different opinions of the blue-line. The most overwhelming belief associated with the blue-line is 
that its placement in communities was determined arbitrarily. Many claim that the blue-line is a 
representation of exactly where the water level will rise in a tsunami event. One individual 
supported these claims by stating “if my foot is on this side of the blue-line (inland side), I am 
dry. If my foot is on this side of the blue-line (seaside), I am wet.” There appears to be confusion 
about why the blue-lines were placed where they were and how their placement was calculated. 
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This leads to distrust of the blue-line and many only describe the blue-line as being a good tool 
for promoting awareness.  
Additionally, another factor influencing the perception of tsunami risk in different 
communities is the belief that the shape of the Wellington harbor protects the region from 
tsunami. Some participants believe that a tsunami cannot enter the harbor, or that the large 
shallow coastline of New Zealand dissipates tsunami waves. This is a misconception, because a 
major tsunami has been produced within the harbor in the 1855 Wellington earthquake. Our data 
supports this misconception because in the harbor communities, tsunami was not listed as a 
major natural disaster as often as in the coastal communities facing the Cook Strait. The coastal 
communities are considered more at risk by participants because they are not protected by the 
harbor.  
4.5 Additional Observations 
While interviewing, we observed participants displaying confusion regarding question 
phrasing and terminology, especially prevalent in Porirua, a lower socioeconomic area. This may 
be a result of poor education in these locations. However, we believe this is not necessarily a 
class specific problem. There may have been confusion amongst more privileged classes, but due 
to social pressures to reflect a certain level of intelligence, they may have been less willing to 
admit ignorance. Initially we received the impression that wealth and general education would 
strongly affect tsunami concern and knowledge. The more educated could be more likely to 
become exposed to natural disaster training. Additionally, wealthier populations may be more 
concerned about tsunami as they have more property investments in the area. Contrastingly, 
lacking the financial stability to recover from a disaster, it is plausible for those of lower 
socioeconomic background to have greater concern of natural disasters in general. Overall, the 
issue of class distinctions is a complicated one, and we could identify no strong associations 
between wealth and tsunami preparedness. It seems that the perception of tsunami risk and initial 
reactions to disaster derive from a deep human response, which is common between people. 
We also feel that the inability of the inhabitants to recognize a tsunami threat when 
presented with the earthquake scenarios is likely because of two reasons. First, natural disaster 
survivors tend to have an optimistic outlook on the likelihood of similar disasters occurring in 
the future; they believe that they will never experience another severe disaster. Second, it is 
plausible that the frequent occurrence of earthquakes has desensitized individuals to this event. 
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During our time interviewing, this was predominantly discovered in older generations. It seems 
as though those that have experienced natural disasters draw on their past experience to help 
them judge how to react during the earthquake-tsunami scenarios. The frequency of earthquakes 
and tendency to draw on past experiences are likely causing individuals to perform only standard 
earthquake evacuation behaviors, despite an earthquake‟s potential to induce a tsunami. 
Comparatively, we discovered individuals who were inexperienced with natural disasters often 
stated that they would follow what they learnt through media or officials, or they would just 
follow what other people were doing.  
 Through our observations, we have realized that individuals have been conditioned to 
expect confirmation of tsunami threat from authority. After considering the reasons why people 
seek confirmation, a possible explanation is that residents do not trust their own instincts to judge 
natural warnings since they have not experienced a devastating tsunami induced by a local 
earthquake. By seeking confirmation, people feel more in control of the situation. 
4.6 Summary 
After conducting almost 400 interviews, the results from our analysis and correlations of 
interview responses revealed themes related to human behavior and the perception of risk. In this 
section, we will review some key findings and analysis. In summary, we discovered the 
following: 
 Residents and visitors are reluctant to engage with interviewers wielding clipboards on public 
grounds. 
 Some participants do not understand interview questions and require rephrasing. 
 Tsunami are considered to be a possible threat but there is a general lack of concern for 
tsunami due to their infrequency. 
 Residents and visitors know to evacuate to higher ground during a tsunami but cannot 
identify natural earthquake warning signs as tsunami threats and are unsure of how official 
disaster sirens sound. 
 Individuals are unsure of what their responsibilities are during an evacuation. 
 Residents tend to evacuate by foot during shorter warnings but as warning times increase 
more tend to evacuate by car . 
 Most residents learn evacuation training from their work place.  
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 Visitors from outside New Zealand usually are unaware and unprepared for tsunami and have 
a low perception of risk towards tsunami threat. 
 Individuals cite distrust of the blue-lines‟ placement because of the misconceptions 
surrounding its purpose. 
 Residents and visitors believe that the shape and location of the Wellington Harbor will 
protect the harbor communities from tsunami. In addition, some participants believe that the 
Bay communities are safe from tsunami because the shape of the shoreline. 
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CHAPTER 5. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Based on the findings and analysis of our pilot study, we developed some 
recommendations that we felt could improve interview or survey structure and data collection 
methods for the study as it moves forward.  Furthermore, based on considerable feedback from 
residents and visitors all over the GWR, we have suggestions that might improve the awareness 
and preparedness in the event of a tsunami.  
5.1 Recommendations for improving interview and data collection 
The recommendations made in this section are based on the interview and data collection 
techniques practiced during this pilot study. In order to make distinctions between interviewers 
and different solicitors, future interviewers could utilize the logos of sponsoring organizations 
such as GNS, WREMO, and CD. Preferably, the logos would be located on clothing or on a 
nearby sign in order to allow the logos to remain large and visible.  
In future surveys or interviews, questions could be phrased more simply in order to avoid 
confusion and random guessing from participants. This will reduce the burden on interviewers 
and increase response rate. Specifically, for questions involving earthquake evacuation scenarios, 
the distinction between long and strong earthquakes is negligible and can be omitted.  
Mail-in surveys can be used to conduct a larger study where face-to-face interviews are 
infeasible. Originally, we opted for open-ended face-to-face interviews rather than closed-ended 
mail-in surveys for three main reasons: 
a) Inability to predict the wide range of possible responses. 
b) Concern about misinterpreted questions. 
c) Concern about biasing questions. 
However, based on the findings of this study, we have developed a solution to remedy these 
problems and will allow for an improved volume of data and reduced human effort granted by 
mail-in surveys. 
Appendix G depicts our suggestion for a pre-coded mail-in survey. The chosen categories are 
based on the thematic trends in responses to the associated open-ended question posed in our 
interviews. From our observations and through the coding process, we have identified these 
categories as both covering the majority of common responses, and providing the fidelity to 
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prevent pigeonholing intended responses into improper categories. The phrasing of these 
questions is based on what we have identified, after many iterations, as the most easily 
understood and unbiased for the specific questions. Finally, we have observed that most of the 
questions with which there is a concern of biasing order are unaffected by ordering. To mitigate 
the remaining ordering bias, we have opted to place the first two questions regarding hazard 
identification on a separate page from the other questions. While proper ordering cannot be 
guaranteed, this reduces the chance of the respondent looking ahead. 
5.2 Recommendations for improving tsunami awareness and preparedness 
Based on the strong start to WREMO‟s tsunami campaign, we encourage WREMO to 
continue implementing the tsunami blue-lines in communities. Our analysis indicates, however, 
that some individuals believed that the blue-line was an "arbitrary point" and that they would not 
rely on it. Also, we found that there was a statistical insignificance between the level of 
awareness and preparedness in the blue-line communities versus the non-blue-line communities. 
This was evident in our findings when we discovered communities in blue-line areas had almost 
equal knowledge about appropriate tsunami evacuation behavior as communities in non-blue-line 
areas. Despite these statistical findings, we do believe that the presence of the blue-line 
contributes somewhat significantly to the level of awareness in the communities based on 
anecdotal findings.  To improve this finding, WREMO could provide information to 
communities either directly to homes within the community or by static means; in order to 
change the prominent misconception and beliefs community members may have about the blue-
line and its function and to improve its credibility. 
It is evident that there is uncertainty amongst residents regarding official tsunami 
warnings. Most reported that they would expect a siren to sound but many admitted that they do 
not know what it would sound like or expressed concern about the presence of alarms in their 
community. It may prove useful to educate the public on what emergency alarms sound like and 
under what circumstances alarms are used. To avoid desensitizing residents to the sound of the 
alarm by conducting frequent drills, Civil Defence and organizations involved with sounding the 
alarm could place audio clips on their website, or send messages to geolink subscribers with a 
preview of the alarm. In the largely populated CBD of Wellington, we discovered that visitors 
were significantly less prepared than residents were. Therefore, we suggest officials work in 
alliance with businesses and restaurants in the CBD waterfront and teach the employees in this 
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area appropriate tsunami evacuation. We also suggest implementing official stickers on buildings 
indicating whether it is in a tsunami danger zone or a tsunami safe building. Finally, we 
recommend developing an awareness tool similar to the blue-line along the waterfront to 
promote awareness amongst visitors and non-CBD residents.  A sample of this sticker is featured 
below in Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14 - A draft illustration of the proposed “Tsunami Safe” sticker 
 
As discussed previously, a significant portion of the population failed to identify 
earthquakes that lasted for more than one minute and earthquakes that are difficult to stand in as 
possible tsunami threats. This can result in a sole focus on earthquake response leaving residents 
and visitors vulnerable to tsunami. In order to raise awareness to these tsunami warnings, we 
suggest developing a slogan in a similar vein to "duck, cover, hold" but in relation to long or 
strong earthquakes.  This slogan could possibly be “Strong? Long? Gone!”  In addition, because 
of the large quantity of respondents who insisted that official warnings would be released in all 
tsunami events, it could be worth clarifying in that campaign that there will not always be an 
official warning.  
Regarding responses related to attempting to evacuate by vehicle, we suggest focusing 
efforts on encouraging residents to never attempt to flee by car. Many residents realized that the 
conditions of the roads may be bad or that there may be significant traffic congestion but would 
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still attempt to flee by vehicle regardless. Many visitors tend to travel on foot because they do 
not own vehicles here. A possible solution would be to designate specific cars to be driven in 
possible tsunami threats using bumper stickers, much like how Japan marked their vehicles. This 
would warn drivers in everyday life to leave their car during an evacuation. Alternatively, 
existing education methods such as signs could be modified to include more specific information 
regarding evacuation means (Figure 15).  
 
 
Figure 15 - A draft illustration signage conveying specific warning signs and transportation methods 
Image of bicycle and car inspired by (Map symbols bike clip art, 2013) and (Bednell holiday homes, 2013)  
 
In response to our evacuation related questions, respondents tended to claim that they 
would help or assist people around them before evacuating. This generates a lot of uncertainty 
regarding how much time they should spend assisting before evacuating. Outlining the 
responsibilities of residents during an evacuation will likely reduce confusion, allowing them to 
focus on adhering to only those responsibilities before evacuating.  Alternatively, Wellington can 
adopt a belief similar to Japan‟s "tsunami tendenko" to teach responsibilities during an 
evacuation. This raises a question: can residents adopt this kind of approach, or does a new set of 
responsibilities, more harmonious with Kiwi values, need to be decided. 
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5.3 Conclusion 
The research conducted in this pilot study has helped confirm suspicions of low tsunami 
preparedness in the GWR. Because New Zealand sits on a seismically active region of the world, 
research dedicated to evaluating and promoting preparedness in the event of an earthquake or 
tsunami is vital. In an age where societies are frequently threatened by disasters, both natural and 
man-made, accurately aligning a community‟s perception of risk to actual threats is an important 
step in lowering mortality rate. The questions and methods involved in our study have been 
refined so that appropriate responses can be acquired from a broad demographic. 
Recommendations have also been generated to improve survey quality for future studies to be 
conducted in the GWR and a suggestion for mail-in surveys has been developed. Education 
efforts must also be effective in communities to properly align perception of risk. Threatened 
communities must implement proper risk communication to prevent life-threatening behaviors 
during disastrous events. Studies such as this one assist in isolating factors of low risk perception 
and developing tools to improve risk perception and disaster preparedness. Education efforts 
such as the blue-line are a step towards stronger tsunami education and can be utilized in a 
broader section of New Zealand and other countries in danger of tsunami. 
Given that this pilot represented a small portion of the GWR, a larger study could be 
conducted to assess a greater demographic over a broader area. Similar studies can be conducted 
in the future in other threatened locations where little is known about tsunami preparedness and 
awareness in order to prepare for a larger study in that area. Once awareness and preparedness of 
an area has been measured, emergency management offices such as WREMO can develop or 
improve education programs to address the gaps in tsunami awareness and preparedness of the 
area. Developing effective disaster education programs is vital in saving lives during earthquakes 
and resultant tsunami in countries with large coastal areas such as New Zealand. As stated 
previously, a significant portion of the world lives near the coast, putting them at risk for 
tsunami. Without proper education in threatened areas, individuals will not be able to react 
quickly enough to a locally induced tsunami, potentially leading to severe damage and loss of 
life as reflected in the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Improving education efforts has been proven 
to help mitigate the loss of life, as seen in the Great East Japan Tsunami in 2011 and the Samoan 
earthquake of 2009. As research is conducted on tsunami awareness and preparedness, education 
programs can properly evolve to minimize the loss of life during natural disasters.  
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A: Interview versions 1-3 
Version 1 
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Version 2 
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Version 3 
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Appendix B: Information presented to participants 
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Appendix C: Algorithms for data analysis 
The following is a collection of Haskell functions employed for analyzing statistical frequencies, 
calculating correlations, and filtering misscoded data. These functions were used in tandem with the 
GHCI interactive environment throughout, to process data and generate graphs, reading data from our 
coded response table „datan.csv‟. Statistical correlation was calculated by assigning all coded responses to 
sequential integers, and calculating by the formula below, where Cov(X,Y) is the covariance between 
question X and question Y. 
        
                 
 
{-#LANGUAGE ParallelListComp #-} 
import Text.ParserCombinators.Parsec 
import Data.Char (isDigit,toLower) 
import qualified Data.Set as S (fromList) 
import System.IO.Unsafe (unsafePerformIO) 
import Data.List 
import Control.Applicative ((<$>)) 
import Data.Function (on) 
import Data.Array 
import Control.Arrow ((&&&)) 
import Data.List.Split (splitOn) 
type CSV = [Record] 
type Record = [Field] 
type Field = String 
csv :: Parser CSV 
csv = do x <- record `sepEndBy` many1 (oneOf "\n\r") 
eof 
return x 
 
record :: Parser Record 
record = (quotedField <|> field) `sepBy` char ',' 
 
field :: Parser Field 
field = many (noneOf ",\n\r\"") 
 
quotedField :: Parser Field 
quotedField = between (char '"') (char '"') $ 
many (noneOf "\"" <|> try (string "\"\"" >> return '"')) 
 
-- | Given a file name (used only for error messages) and a string to 
-- parse, run the parser. 
parseCSV :: FilePath -> String -> Either ParseError CSV 
parseCSV = parse csv 
 
-- | Given a file name, read from that file and run the parser 
parseCSVFromFile :: FilePath -> IO (Either ParseError CSV) 
parseCSVFromFile = parseFromFile csv 
 
-- | Given a string, run the parser, and print the result on stdout. 
parseCSVTest :: String -> IO () 
parseCSVTest = parseTest csv 
 
-- | Given an object of type CSV, generate a CSV formatted 
-- string. Always uses escaped fields. 
printCSV :: CSV -> String 
printCSV records = unlines (printRecord `map` records) 
where printRecord = concat . intersperse "," . map printField 
printField f = "\"" ++ concatMap escape f ++ "\"" 
escape '"' = "\"\"" 
escape x = [x] 
 
readCSV f = do; f' <- parseCSVFromFile f;case f' of;Right x ->  return x 
toResponse (x:xs) = transpose [map (R q) r | q <- x | r <- transpose xs] 
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data Response = R {question :: String, response :: String} deriving (Eq,Ord) 
instance Show Response where 
show (R x y) = "("++x++":"++y++")" 
sfield q x = [r | x' <- x, R q' r <- x',q'==q] 
selectAll ps x = [x' | x' <- x, all p' x'] 
where p' (R q' r) = and [p r | (qq,p) <- ps,qq==q'] 
select qs ps x = [[r | R q' r <- x', q' `elem` qs] | x' <- x, all p' x'] 
where p' (R q' r) = and [p r | (qq,p) <- ps,qq==q'] 
cluster x = reverse . sortBy (compare `on` fst) . map (length &&& head) . group . sort $ x 
fcluster q x = cluster $ sfield q x 
clusterM x = let x' = cluster x in mapM_ print x' >> return x' 
fclusterM q x = (clusterM $ sfield q x) 
fclusterM_ q x = (clusterM $ sfield q x) >> return () 
recluster x = reverse $ sortBy (compare `on` fst) [(sum [n | (n,qq) <- x,isInfixOf q qq],q) | q 
<- lbs] where 
lbs = nub $ (map snd x) >>= split 
fclusterSplit q x = recluster $ cluster $ sfield q x 
fclusterSplitM_ q x = mapM_ print cl >> return (sum $ map fst cl) where 
cl = fclusterSplit q x 
clusterTotal q x = sum `fmap` map fst `fmap` fclusterM q x 
x & f = f x 
f |.| g = \x -> f x || g x 
 
mainnn = do 
a <- toResponse <$> map (map (map toLower)) <$> readCSV "datan.csv" 
let b = a & recode "whathaz" ["eq"] "earthquake" & 
recode "sex" ["male"] "m" & 
recode "whathaz" ["typhoon","wind","tornado","storms","huricane","cyclone"] "storm" & 
recode "whathaz" ["asteroid","solar flare"] "other" & 
recode "whathaz" ["flooding","floods"] "flood" & 
recode "whathaz" ["landslides"] "landslide" & 
recode "whathaz" ["tunsami"] "tsunami" & 
recode "whathaz" ["not sure"] "?" & 
recode "eqhaz" ["liquefication","liquefation"] "liquefaction" & 
recode "eqhaz" ["drowning into sea","volcano","sea","damage","falling"] "other" & 
recode "eqhaz" ["landlside","landslides"] "landslide" & 
recode "eqhaz" ["tusnami"] "tsunami" & 
recode "eqhaz" ["confusion"] "hysteria" & 
recode "eqhaz" ["collape","collapsing"] "collapse"  & 
recode "eqhaz" ["sewage"] "sanitation"  & 
recode "eqhaz" ["debri"] "debris"  & 
recode "eqhaz" ["essentials"] "essential"  & 
recode "eqhaz" ["fault"] "faulting" & 
recode "eqhaz" ["gas"] "gas leak"  & 
recode "whatwarn" ["people","panic"] "human"  & 
recode "whatwarn" ["newspaper"] "other"  & 
recode "whatwarn" ["tsunami"] "sea" & 
recode "whatwarn" ["news"] "media" & 
recode "whatwarn" ["siren/news","tws","siren"] "alarm" & 
recode "whatwarn" ["govt","cd"] "?"  & 
recode "feeleq" ["very strong eq lasts for more than a few seconds","cd","stronglong"] 
"strong,long" & 
recode "feeleq" ["landslide"] "earth"  & 
recode "feeleq" ["any earthquake that last longer than 10seconds"] "long" & 
recode "feeleq" ["building falling/ far out earthquake in the crook strait"] "building,offshore" 
& 
recode "feeleq" ["not sure how it would be different than another quake","all"] "?" & 
recode "feeleq" ["offshore eq","off shore"] "offshore" & 
recode "feeleq" ["4.0 or 5.0 richter scale"] "richter" & 
recode "feeleq" ["terrifying"] "other" & 
recode "feeleq" ["no"] "cannot determine" & 
recode "feeleq" ["unsure"] "?" & 
recode "feeleq" ["immeasruable","immeasurbale"] "immeasurable" & 
recode "minprior" ["fill up the fridge for 3 days of food"] "food" & 
recode "minprior" ["warning others on way","check","do what you can to help from 
safety","assisy","people you're with are safe","help elderly neighbors"] "assist" & 
recode "minprior" ["supermarket","warm stuff","grab essential supplies","grab pack","grab 
stuff","supplies","emergency bags","get gas","pack bags","clothes"] "essential" & 
recode "minprior" ["passports"] "documents" & 
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recode "minprior" ["quick prayer","pick up coffee","grab a few things","and bits and 
pieces","no","local"] "other" & 
recode "minprior" ["photos","videos of family"] "valuable" & 
recode "minprior" ["just go home","run","shelter","home"] "nothing" & 
recode "minprior" ["radio"] "tuned" & 
recode "minprior" ["grab children","family"] "gather" & 
recode "minprior" ["phone family","txt everybody","call family"] "phone" & 
recode "minprior" ["close windows"] "secure" & 
recode "minprior" ["?"] "unsure" & 
recode "minprior" ["pets"] "pet" & 
recode "standprior" ["inform","check"] "assist" & 
recode "standprior" ["pets"] "pet" & 
recode "standprior" ["essentials","basic essentials","grab stuff at home - clothes"] "essential" 
& 
recode "standprior" ["carry children","family"] "gather" & 
recode "standprior" ["call family"] "phone" & 
recode "standprior" ["no","local"] "nothing" & 
recode "1hrprior" ["fone","call family","text"] "phone" & 
recode "1hrprior" ["essentials"] "essential" & 
recode "1hrprior" ["check"] "assist" & 
recode "1hrprior" ["no"] "nothing" & 
recode "9hrprior" ["turn off utilities"] "secure" & 
recode "9hrprior" ["check"] "assist" & 
recode "9hrprior" ["call family"] "phone" & 
recode "9hrprior" ["essentials"] "essential" & 
recode "minevacwhere" ["school (o'haro bay school)"] "evac point" & 
recodes ["minevacwhere","standevacwhere"] ["if tsunami go to kawhehi/ if not go to work"] "stay" 
& 
recodes ["minevacwhere","standevacwhere"] ["go home then up valley"] "inland" & 
recodes ["minevacwhere","standevacwhere"] ["home (maragaki motor cross)"] "home" & 
recodes ["minevacwhere","standevacwhere"] ["northwest hills (away from buildings)"] "hill,open" & 
recodes ["minevacwhere","standevacwhere"] ["uphill","up hill"] "high ground" & 
recode "standevacwhere" ["towards (karwhehi)"] "inland" & 
recode "standevacwhere" ["hospital"] "evac point" & 
recode "standevacwhere" ["palmerston north area"] "leave" & 
recode "standevacwhere" ["blue line"] "blue" & 
recode "standevacwhere" ["(home) maragaki motor cross"] "home" & 
recode "standevacwhere" ["offshore"] "other" & 
recode "standevacwhere" ["phone"] "stay" & 
recode "1hrevac" ["mt. maumga","hill behind house (west)","brooklyn hill"] "hill" & 
recode "1hrevac" ["mt. cook","mt.cook"] "mt cook" & 
recode "1hrevac" ["up valley"] "inland" & 
recode "1hrevac" ["open"] "?" & 
recode "1hrevac" ["mt.victoria/ go inland","mt. victoria"] "mt victoria" & 
recode "1hrevac" ["home high ground"] "home,high ground" & 
recode "1hrevac" ["home (wainui o' marta)","home (tirohanga)","home (maragaki motor cross)","home 
(hutt valley)"] "home" & 
recode "1hrevac" ["kelburn university"] "leave,evac point" & 
recode "1hrevac" ["hutt valley","kelburn","up to brooklyn"] "leave" & 
recode "1hrevac" ["go uphill","go to higher ground","uphill","the nearest high building that 
would allow me in or go home to tawa"] "high ground"  & 
recode "1hrevac" ["evacpoint"] "evac point" & 
recode "9hrevac" ["mt.victoria"] "mt victoria" & 
recode "9hrevac" ["uphil","uphill","higher ground"] "high ground" & 
recode "9hrevac" ["karori","kaori","fly"] "leave" & 
recode "9hrevac" ["go to berkley rd","further inland"] "inland" & 
recode "9hrevac" ["above blue line"] "blue" & 
recode "9hrevac" ["home (naenae)","home (maragaki motor cross)","home (hutt valley)"] "home" & 
recode "9hrevac" ["home (mt.cook)"] "home,mt cook" & 
recode "9hrevac" ["home high ground"] "home,high ground" & 
recode "9hrevac" ["botannical garden"] "hill" & 
recode "9hrevac" ["central north island"] "leave,inland" & 
recode "9hrevac" ["evact point"] "evac point" & 
recodes ["9hrtravel","1hrtravel","mintravel","standtravel"] ["bicycle","bicyle"] "bike" & 
recodes ["9hrtravel","1hrtravel","mintravel","standtravel"] ["run","walk"] "foot" & 
recode "1hrtravel" ["motorbike"] "car" & 
recode "standtravel" ["bike/foot"] "bike,foot" & 
recodes ["standtravel","mintravel","1hrtravel","9hrtravel"] ["unsure"] "?" & 
recode "standtravel" ["food"] "foot" & 
recode "wheneq" ["anytime","at any time"] "?" & 
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recode "wheneq" ["within lifetime"] "lifetime" & 
recode "wheneq" ["not lifetime ","not at all"] "not lifetime" & 
recode "wheneq" ["10 years"] "10" & 
recodeAge & 
globalRecode [("unsure","?"),("mt.victoria","mt victoria")] & 
map (>>= (\(R q r) -> if q/="suburb" then [R q r] else [R q r,R "isblue" (show $ isBlueLine r)])) 
& 
map (>>= (\(R q r) -> if q/="whathaz" then [R q r] else [R q r,R "tsuhaz" (show $ "tsunami" 
`elem` split r)])) & 
map (>>= (\(R q r) -> if q/="eqhaz" then [R q r] else [R q r,R "tsueq" (show $ "tsunami" `elem` 
split r)])) 
 
return b 
 
mapResp q f = map (\(R q' r) -> if q==q' then R q' (f r) else R q' r) 
recodeAge = map (mapResp "birth" $ codeAge) where 
codeAge = codeAge' (f ages) where 
codeAge' fs c = if all isDigit c && not (null c) then (show $ length $ takeWhile not $ map 
($2013-(read c :: Int)) fs) else "" 
ages = 0:16:[20,25..85] 
f [i] = [(>i)] 
f (i:j:is) = (\q -> q >= i && q < j) : f (j:is) 
 
globalRecode codes x = map (map ff) x where 
ff r = case lookup (response r) codes of;Nothing -> r;Just r' -> r {response = r'} 
split = map strip . splitOn "," 
where strip = let f = dropWhile (==' ') in reverse.f.reverse.f 
unsplit = foldr (\xs b -> xs ++ (if null b then b else ',':b)) [] 
splitMap f = unsplit . map f . split 
recode q fs f x = map (map rFun) x 
where rFun (R q' r) = if q'==q then R q' (splitMap (\r' -> if r' `elem` fs then f else r') r) 
else R q' r 
recodes qs fs f x = foldr (.) id (map (\q -> recode q fs f) qs) x 
 
whathaz = nub $ sfield "whathaz" mainn >>= split 
feeleq = nub $ sfield "feeleq" mainn >>= split 
eqhaz = nub $ sfield "eqhaz" mainn >>= split 
whatwarn = nub $ sfield "whatwarn" mainn >>= split 
standprior = nub $ sfield "standprior" mainn >>= split 
standtravel = nub $ sfield "standtravel" mainn >>= split 
minprior = nub $ sfield "minprior" mainn >>= split 
mintravel = nub $ sfield "mintravel" mainn >>= split 
hrprior = nub $ sfield "1hrprior" mainn >>= split 
hrtravel = nub $ sfield "1hrtravel" mainn >>= split 
hr9prior = nub $ sfield "9hrprior" mainn >>= split 
hr9travel = nub $ sfield "9hrtravel" mainn >>= split 
standevac = nub $ sfield "standevacwhere" mainn >>= split 
minevac = nub $ sfield "minevacwhere" mainn >>= split 
hrevac = nub $ sfield "1hrevac" mainn >>= split 
hr9evac = nub $ sfield "9hrevac" mainn >>= split 
standevacExpand (R q r) = if q=="standevacwhere" then [R ("standevacwhere_"++a) $ show $ any 
(==a) $ split r | a <- standevac] else [R q r] 
minevacExpand (R q r) = if q=="minevacwhere" then [R ("minevacwhere_"++a) $ show $ any (==a) $ 
split r | a <- minevac] else [R q r] 
hrevacExpand (R q r) = if q=="1hrevac" then [R ("1hrevac_"++a) $ show $ any (==a) $ split r | a 
<- hrevac] else [R q r] 
hr9evacExpand (R q r) = if q=="9hrevac" then [R ("9hrevac_"++a) $ show $ any (==a) $ split r | a 
<- hr9evac] else [R q r] 
standtravelExpand (R q r) = if q=="standtravel" then [R ("standtravel_"++a) $ show $ any (==a) $ 
split r | a <- standtravel] else [R q r] 
mintravelExpand (R q r) = if q=="mintravel" then [R ("mintravel_"++a) $ show $ any (==a) $ split 
r | a <- mintravel] else [R q r] 
hrtravelExpand (R q r) = if q=="1hrtravel" then [R ("1hrtravel_"++a) $ show $ any (==a) $ split r 
| a <- hrtravel] else [R q r] 
hr9travelExpand (R q r) = if q=="9hrtravel" then [R ("9hrtravel_"++a) $ show $ any (==a) $ split 
r | a <- hr9travel] else [R q r] 
whatHazExpand (R q r) = if q=="whathaz" then [R ("whathaz_"++a) $ show $ any (==a) $ split r | a 
<- whathaz] else [R q r] 
eqhazExpand (R q r) = if q=="eqhaz" then [R ("eqhaz_"++a) $ show $ any (==a) $ split r | a <- 
eqhaz] else [R q r] 
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standpriorExpand (R q r) = if q=="standprior" then [R ("standprior_"++a) $ show $ any (==a) $ 
split r | a <- standprior] else [R q r] 
minpriorExpand (R q r) = if q=="minprior" then [R ("minprior_"++a) $ show $ any (==a) $ split r | 
a <- minprior] else [R q r] 
hrpriorExpand (R q r) = if q=="1hrprior" then [R ("1hrprior_"++a) $ show $ any (==a) $ split r | 
a <- hrprior] else [R q r] 
hr9priorExpand (R q r) = if q=="9hrprior" then [R ("9hrprior_"++a) $ show $ any (==a) $ split r | 
a <- hr9prior] else [R q r] 
feelExpand (R q r) = if q=="feeleq" then [R ("feeleq_"++a) $ show $ any (==a) $ split r | a <- 
feeleq] else [R q r] 
whatWarnExpand (R q r) = if q=="whatwarn" then [R ("whatwarn_"++a) $ show $ any (==a) $ split r | 
a <- whatwarn] else [R q r] 
mainn = unsafePerformIO mainnn 
replace (R q' r) rs = map (\(R x y) -> if x==q' then R q' r else R x y) rs 
warnExpand a = a' ++ foldr replace defwho whowarn ++ foldr replace deflong howlong where 
warnings = concat [split r | R q r <- a,q=="whatwarn"] 
whowarn = [R ("whowarn_"++w) r | w <- warnings | r <- split $ head [rr | R qq rr <- 
a,qq=="whowarn"]] 
howlong = [R ("howlong_"++w) r | w <- warnings | r <- split $ head [rr | R qq rr <- 
a,qq=="howlong"]] 
defwho = [R ("whowarn_"++q) "_" | q <- whatwarn] 
deflong = [R ("howlong_"++q) "_" | q <- whatwarn] 
a' = filter (\(R q r) -> q `notElem` ["whatwarn","whowarn","howlong"]) (a >>= whatWarnExpand) 
ggg = head mainn 
fff = map (\x -> sort $ warnExpand x >>= feelExpand >>= whatHazExpand >>= hrpriorExpand >>= 
hr9priorExpand >>= standpriorExpand >>= minpriorExpand >>= standtravelExpand >>= mintravelExpand 
>>= hrtravelExpand >>= hr9travelExpand >>= eqhazExpand >>= standevacExpand >>= minevacExpand >>= 
hrevacExpand >>= hr9evacExpand) mainn 
ffff = map (\x -> sort $ warnExpand x >>= feelExpand >>= whatHazExpand >>= hrpriorExpand >>= 
hr9priorExpand >>= standpriorExpand >>= minpriorExpand >>= standtravelExpand >>= mintravelExpand 
>>= hrtravelExpand >>= hr9travelExpand >>= eqhazExpand >>= standevacExpand >>= minevacExpand >>= 
hrevacExpand >>= hr9evacExpand) fixed 
unResponse xs = r1:rs where 
r1 = map question $ head xs 
rs = map (map response) xs 
unCSV xs = unlines cs where 
cs = map (unsplit . map (\x -> "\""++x++"\"")) $ unResponse xs 
writeCSV f xs = writeFile f (unCSV xs) 
mainf = writeCSV "derp.csv" fff 
mainf2 = writeCSV "derp2.csv" mainn 
 
table f x y = array ((0,0),(b1,b2)) [((i,j),f (x!i) (y!j)) | i <- [0..b1], j <- [0..b2]] 
where ((_,b1),(_,b2)) = (bounds x,bounds y) 
l2a x = listArray (0,length x -1) x 
a2l x = map snd $ assocs x 
indexOf xs x = indexOf' 0 x xs where 
indexOf' n x [] = -1 
indexOf' n x (y:xs) = if x==y then n else indexOf' (n+1) x xs 
indicies xs = map (indexOf xs) xs -- inverse is: (lbls!!) 
lbls = map question (head fixed) 
vals = map (flip sfield fixed) lbls 
mapTo xs x = case lookupWith setEq x xs of;Just v -> v;Nothing -> error (show x ++ show xs) 
setEq = ((==) `on` (S.fromList . split)) 
lookupWith _ _ [] = Nothing 
lookupWith f x ((y,v):xs) = if f x y then Just v else lookupWith f x xs 
mapFrom xs x = mapTo [(y,x) | (x,y) <- xs] x 
mapping q = [(i,x) | x <- sort $ nubBy setEq q | i <- [0..]] 
valmap = map mapping vals :: [[(Int,String)]] 
codedvals = zipWith (\a b -> map (mapFrom a) b) valmap vals 
avg xs = fromIntegral (sum xs) / genericLength xs 
covar x y = avg $ zipWith (*) x y 
correl x y = covar x y / (sqrt $ covar x x * covar y y) 
correlMat x = let ix = [0..length x -1] in [[(lbls!!i,lbls!!j,correl (x!!i) (x!!j)) | i <- ix] | 
j <- ix] 
main = mapM_ print $ reverse $ nubBy (\(a,b,c) (x,y,z) -> symEq (a,b) (x,y)) $ sortBy (compare 
`on` (\(a,b,c) -> abs c)) $ filter ((\(a,b,c) -> a/=b && (not $ isNaN c))) $ concat $ correlMat 
codedvals 
--writeCorrels f = main >>= (writeFile f . unlines . map show) 
symEq (x,y) (a,b) = (x,y)==(a,b)||(y,x)==(a,b) 
aZipWith f x y = accum f x $ filter (inRange (bounds x) . fst) $ assocs y 
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--NOTE TO SELF. CREATE CAUSALITY GRAPH 
 
isHarbor x = elem x ["cbd","petone"] 
isBlueLine x = elem x ["owhiro","island"] 
 
spitData l xs = (print $ "###"++l++"###") >> pretty' xs where 
pretty' xs = putStrLn (unwords $ map snd xs) >> putStrLn (unwords $ map (show. fst) xs) 
scluster l xs = spitData l $ fcluster l xs 
--sclusterSplit l ps xs = 
mmm m = mapM_ (\(x,f) -> spitData x (f x m)) 
[("wheneq",fcluster), 
("birth",fcluster), 
("eqhaz",fclusterSplit), 
("whathaz",fclusterSplit), 
("feeleq",fclusterSplit), 
("standprior",fclusterSplit), 
("minprior",fclusterSplit), 
("standtravel",fclusterSplit), 
("mintravel",fclusterSplit), 
("1hrtravel",fclusterSplit), 
("9hrtravel",fclusterSplit), 
("standevacwhere",fclusterSplit), 
("1hrevac",fclusterSplit), 
("9hrevac",fclusterSplit), 
("income",fcluster), 
("tsuhaz",fcluster), 
("tsueq",fcluster), 
("standevac",(\a b -> fclusterSplit a (selectAll [("suburb",isBlueLine)] b))), 
("standevac",(\a b -> fclusterSplit a (selectAll [("suburb",not . isBlueLine)] b))), 
("whatwarn",fclusterSplit)] 
fixed = selectAll [] mainn 
 
clusterAlarmTime = sortBy (compare `on` (\(a,b) -> if all isDigit b then read b else 0)) $ 
fcluster "howlong_alarm" ffff 
 
 
incomegraph q x = mapM_ (\i -> putStrLn "" >> (fclusterM_ q $ selectAll [("income",(==show i))] 
x)) [1..15] 
agegraph q x = mapM_ (\i -> putStrLn "" >> (fclusterM_ q $ selectAll [("birth",(==show i))] x)) 
[1..15] 
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Appendix D: Coding guide 
The coding guide was based off of interview version 2, which can be seen in appendix A 
1. What two natural disasters do you believe are most likely to affect your current location? 
EQ      
tsunami  
tidal wave 
fire      
storm (rain, cyclone, hurricane, typhoon, wind…) 
tornado 
landslide  
flood (Regardless of source) 
volcano  
disease 
other (asteroid, solar flare, alien attack, ocean level rising, drought…) 
 
2. What life-threatening hazards and dangers do you associate with an earthquake? 
tsunami 
tidal wave 
debris (glass, metal, electrocution (Fallen power lines…): This category refers to any harmful 
interaction with debris or smaller items, includes falling objects) 
fire 
collapse (building collapse, buildings damage, structure collapse, squashed, crushed…): This 
category refers to hazards caused by collapse or damaged buildings 
sanitation (sewage issues, disease…: this category refers to hazards caused by damage to waste 
management/treatment) 
food (food issues): This category refers to shortages or issues with food 
water 
roadway (road/highway/automobile issues): This category refers to damages to roads or vehicles 
that are causing the participant harm 
Faulting (cracks/holes/openings in ground): This category refers to any changes in the earth that 
could cause physical harm) 
explosion 
gas leak 
Flood 
landslide 
essential (loss of electricity, gas, heat, essential items, general isolation): This category refers to 
loss or inability to gain access essentials 
hysteria (panic, trampling…): This category refers to any harm caused to people by people 
responding in harmful/ inappropriate ways. 
other (communication loss, water displacement, things moving…): This category refers to non-
life-threatening inconveniences or occurrences from an EQ as well as unclear or inappropriate 
responses) 
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3. What would warn you of an incoming tsunami? 
a. EQ (tremors, ground shaking/rumbling)   
alarm (sirens, horns, bells, warning systems…) 
sea (tide receding, horizon changes, water changes, strange ocean noises): This category refers to 
any warning discovered by observing the sea 
animal (abnormal animal behavior, animal warnings): This category refers to any warning 
discovered by observing animals/pets/etc. 
human (people warning others, people screaming, people panicking, people running): This 
category refers to warnings delivered by local word of mouth 
phone (txts, alert txts, calls, alert calls): This category refers to any warning received on a mobile 
or home phone 
internet (Facebook, twitter, news websites): This category refers to any warning discovered on 
the internet 
media (unspecified mass communication, unspecified news stations) 
radio     TV (any station: news, weather, etc.) 
weather (Stormy weather) 
other (this category refers to any warning that is inappropriate, unclear, or unique) 
 
b. CD (“civil Defence” or “Public Defence”) 
GNS 
WREMO 
council (city council) 
govt: This category refers to government affiliated organization (except CD, GNS, WREMO, and 
city council), state institutions, and scientists in related fields 
PTWC (Pacific tsunami warning center) 
public: This category refers to unorganized responders issuing independent warnings 
subscription (geonet, twitter, etc): This refers to any non-governmental organization that issues a 
warning based on subscription 
geonet (non-subscription viewings) 
fire (fire brigade) 
police 
news: This category refers to organizations who job is it to transmit news. can be TV, radio, 
internet… 
station (radio stations, TV stations) 
social media (twitter, facebook, google+) 
other (this category refers to anything that is inappropriate, unclear, or especially unique) 
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c. immediately  
not long (not long, not very long, short amount of time, “pretty quick”, “very soon”): This 
category refers to any expression given for a short amount of time that we cannot interpret 
depends: This category refers to a response that states that the time depends on characteristics of 
EQ‟s or tsunami, or a response that depends on the arrival of an EQ/tsunami 
1-5 [minutes] (also includes any variation of “a few minutes” or “a couple of minutes” or 
“minutes”) 
5 10 [minutes]  
10-30 [minutes] 
30 [minutes] – 1 [hour] 
1 [hour]-3 [hours] (also includes any variation of “a few hours” or “a couple of hours” or “hours” 
or “several hours”) 
3 [hours] - 9 [hours] 
more than 9 [hours] 
inform (wait to be told what to do, or depends on what news says) 
 
INSTRUCTION ON CODING TIMES 
[for ranges of time that span more than 1 hour, use the minimum. Otherwise, take the average of 
the range] 
[if depends and we forced the range, then use lowest range]  
[For phrases such as “several hours” “several minutes” “minutes” “hours”, use top of range] 
[if depends, but only given a higher range, just put “depends”] 
 
4. Describe properties of an earthquake that you believe could cause a tsunami severe enough 
to need to evacuate. 
strong (big movements, large, intense…)  
long: This category refers to responses that imply length but do not specify an exact time, 30 
seconds, a few minutes, 2 minutes) 
richter (any response referencing a measurement of the Richter scale or magnitude) 
unsure (any response that is unsure or “don‟t know” or “any size” or “hard to tell”) 
immeasurable (any response reported that is immeasurable to the respondent other than plate 
movement)  
  Offshore (Out at sea.  Also can imply that they can‟t feel the EQ) 
directional (specific directional shaking) 
loud 
plate (any response referring to tectonic plates) 
stand (a response that implies that it is difficult to stand in) 
minute (a response that specifically mentions lasting more than 1 minute) 
object (a response that is based on objects moving or falling, does not include the earth) 
building (a response that refers to structure collapse, or structure movement) 
earth (a response based on observing changes in the earth: rolling) 
other (this category refers to anything that is inappropriate, unclear, or especially unique) 
cannot determine (All sizes of EQ‟s can cause tsunami) 
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5. If you were to evacuate, where would you evacuate to? 
stay (wouldn‟t evacuate) 
open: (any evacuation towards “open” areas including: streets, parks, fields) 
waterfront (any evacuation towards water) 
high ground (any evacuation to guessed higher ground) 
hill (any evacuation to named hill such as botanic garden) 
mt victoria 
mt cook 
inland (any evacuation away from water or north into island) 
home (any evacuation home, but it is on low ground or the elevation of their home is unclear) 
building (any evacuation attempt to seek refuge in a building) 
evac point (schools, civil defence centers) 
objects (any attempt to evacuate in or under a table, chair, doorway, car or other objects.) 
unsure (no indication of evacuation site, but ensures evacuation) 
follow (will evacuate where told to) 
leave (any evacuation out of current suburb to another named area) 
blue (above blue line) 
  
5b.  What would you do before evacuating? 
nothing  
phone (any call or text made to friends, family, neighbors, or colleagues) 
valuable (retrieving items of value including important papers, cash, credit cards, electronics, 
“stuff”, personal belongings…) 
essential (retrieving essential items including clothing, medication, first aid, things…) 
kit (emergency kit) 
food 
water 
assist (attempt to warn people, gather people, help people, or check on people around interviewer) 
secure (attempt to turn off utilities or secure home or business) 
gather (attempt to meet, or retrieve family, friends, neighbors, or colleagues) 
check - would fall under assist (checking on distant people without knowing by what means) 
pet (attempt to recover pets) 
tuned (wait for more information regarding disaster or evacuation) 
follow (following others or ask people for advice) 
investigate (investigate further into possible threats, through internet and such means) 
unsure 
wait (would wait to proceed) 
other (assessing situation, get down on the ground, buy train tickets for family) 
 
5bi.  How long would it take? 
no time (immediately) 
1 [second] – 1 [minute] 
1 – 5 [minutes] (also pertains to “a few minutes” and “a couple of minutes”) 
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5 – 10 [minutes] 
10 – 30 [minutes] 
30 [minutes] – 1 [hour] 
1 [hour] – 3 [hours] 
3 [hours] – 9 [hours] 
more than 9 [hours] 
quickly as possible (also pertains to “as long as needed”) 
not long (also pertains to “minutes” “very little time”) 
while (responses involving “a while” or “a long time”, “Decent amount of time”) 
depends 
unsure 
other  
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CODING TIME 
[Take the maximum amount of time if range is given.  This way, we know up to the most time it would 
take to evacuate] 
 
5c.  How would you travel? 
foot 
bicycle 
car 
public (including buses and trains) 
taxis 
fly (airplanes) 
unsure (also includes responses that state it “depends” on certain aspects of the situation) 
 
9a.  Have you received tsunami info?  
yes 
no 
 
9b.  What did you learn? 
evacuation (proper zones, routes, and behavior) 
preparation (emergency kits and proper supplies) 
natural (how to identify tsunami through natural warnings) 
official (what official warnings exist) 
drop (earthquake drop, cover, hold) 
shakeout (participated in shakeout program) 
vague: Refers to a response that is too unclear to categorize 
tsunami 
fire (fire drill training) 
EQ (earthquake training) 
 
9c.  Where did you learn it? 
mail (pamphlets in mail) 
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news (learned about information from news sources including newspaper, radio, or television) 
work (conducted drills at workplace) 
CD (received info from civil defence or partook in a civil defence meeting, talk, or drill) 
school (conducted drills in a school) 
govt (received info from government related ads or sources) 
evacuation (took part in an actual tsunami evacuation; experience) 
online (learned from online sources) 
Te Papa (Any MUSEUM) 
Exp (experience) 
community (interaction with community: word of mouth, etc.) 
 
10a.  Do you know what the blue line is? 
no 
yes 
guess (Guessed correctly) 
 
 
10b.  Where did you learn about it? 
mail 
wom (word of mouth) 
newspaper 
session (informational session at work, school, etc.) 
internet  
media (television or radio broadcasts, “on the news”) 
saw (Saw the line itself and figured it out) 
GNS 
unsure 
sign 
other 
 
11.  When do you expect the next tsunami to strike? 
1 (1 year) 
10 (10 years) 
Lifetime (anytime) 
not lifetime 
unsure 
 
12.  Where would a tsunami originate from? 
Pacific (ocean)(southeast Asian region) 
cook strait (south of wellington) 
nz south island 
ring of fire 
nz coastal area 
tasman (Sea) 
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fault (New Zealand) 
south pole 
subduction zone 
south america 
north America 
wellington (wellington land) 
alaska 
harbor (wellington harbor) 
japan 
plate (plate boundary) 
trench 
volcano (undersea volcano) 
Petone Fault 
Basin 
indonesia  
mariana trench 
Unsure (south of wellington) 
 
 
demographic 
 
 Profession? 
 managers and administrators 
 professionals 
 associate professionals 
 technicians and trades workers 
 community & personal service workers 
 clerical and administrative workers 
 sales workers 
 machinery operators and drivers 
 laborers and related workers 
 
 
How severely would a tsunami affect your livelihood? 
severely 
not severely 
good (I would benefit from a tsunami) 
 
Age? 
 15 – 19 years 
 20 – 24 years 
 25 – 29 years 
 30 – 34 years 
 35 – 39 years 
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 40 – 44 years 
 45 – 49 years 
 50 – 54 years 
 55 – 59 years 
 60 – 64 years 
 65 – 69 years 
 70 – 74 years 
 75 – 79 years 
 80 – 84 years 
 85 years + 
 
Gender? 
 male 
 female 
 
Education? 
1. school 
2. trade 
3. qualification 
4. undergraduate 
5. postgraduate 
 
Are you a resident or visitor? 
 resident  
 visitor 
 
How long have you lived here? 
0 – 1 years 
1 – 2 years 
2 – 3 years 
3 – 4 years 
4 – 5 years 
5 – 10 years 
10+ years 
 
Where are you visiting from? 
 will be analyzed separately  
 
 How often do you visit? 
1.more often 
2.monthly 
3.Annually 
4.less often 
5.First visit 
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Where do you live? 
 will be analyzed separately or… 
inland - low-lying area (in a tsunami threating area/ below the blue line) 
coastal area (above the blue line/ safe zone) 
coastal area (in a low-lying area) 
(use zone evacuation map) 
 
Household income? 
1. <20,000 
2. 20,001-30,000 
3. 30,001-50,000 
4. 50,001-70,000 
5. 70,001-100,000 
6. 100,000+ 
 
 
When listing two items for a single item in a list that is order specific, group those two items in 
parentheses and separate each item in the parentheses by a comma, no spaces. 
GNS or CD = (GNS,CD) 
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Appendix E: Strongly correlated response themes 
This table shows a selection of statistically significant correlations between themes in our data side-by-
side 
Evacuation behavior for >1min EQ Evacuation behavior for EQ too strong to stand 
Travel method for 1hr tsunami warning Travel method for earthquake evacuation 
Has tsunami training Evacuation location 
Has tsunami training Knows of the blue-line 
Has tsunami training Evacuation transportation method 
How soon a tsunami is expected Evacuation behavior for earthquakes 
Travel method for 1hr tsunami warning Travel method for 9hr tsunami warning 
Income Evacuation behavior 
Knowledge of the blue-line How soon a tsunami is expected 
Age Evacuation behavior 
Kowledge of the blue-line How severely a tsunami would affect 
Evacuation location Evacuation transportation method 
Income How soon a tsunami is expected 
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Appendix F: Additional figures 
 
 
"When would you expect the next damaging tsunami to affect the GWR?" 
 
 
 
Hazards associated with earthquakes 
Within 1 year 
2% 
Within 10 years 
18% 
Within lifetime 
33% 
Not within 
lifetime 
32% 
Don't know 
15% 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
%
 o
f 
re
sp
o
n
d
e
n
ts
 
74 
  
 
Expected tsunami time after alarm 
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Associate tsunami with earthquake 
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Consider tsunami a general threat, distributed by age 
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Pre-evacuation behavior in earthquake 
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Expected tsunami warning sources 
 
 
Signs by Lyall Bay beach depicting public hierarchy of public announcements 
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Appendix G: Mail-in survey 
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